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The European Union and WTO law: a
nexus of reactive, coactive, and
proactive approaches
ANTON I S ANTON IAD I S *
Durham University and Durham European Law Institute
Abstract : Ranging from the denial of direct eﬀect to WTO law by the Court
of Justice to a WTO-friendly legislative culture currently booming in the EU’s
political institutions, diﬀerent approaches towards WTO law have been adopted
within the EU. This article classiﬁes the diﬀerent approaches into reactive,
coactive, and proactive by drawing on their common characteristics. The
principal aim is to explore the considerations shaping the development of the
diﬀerent approaches and to argue that these stem from the interaction between
the judiciary and the legislature. In doing so, this article purports to provide a
comprehensive view of the application of WTO law within the Community
legal order.
1. Introduction
The discussion concerning the application of WTO law in the Community legal
order is not new. While the importance of the issue is undoubted, academic
comment has largely focused on the judicial treatment aﬀorded by the Court of
Justice towards WTO law, and neglected the multifarious aspects of its application
by the Union institutions.1 This article aims to ﬁll the vacuum by engaging the
Community’s political institutions alongside the Court of Justice and scrutinizing
the interaction between the judiciary and the legislature. It thereby aims to
better comprehend the broader ramiﬁcations of WTO law in the Community legal
order.
In order to achieve its aims, the present analysis will cut across institutional
practice, draw the commonalities between the diﬀerent approaches of the
* I am grateful to Tony Arnull, Roy Davis, Robert Schu¨tze, Colin Warbrick, Marc Be´nitah, Stijn Billiet,
Rafael Leal-Arcas, the anonymous referees and the members of the editorial board of World Trade Review
for their comments. I am responsible for all remaining shortcomings.
1 Allan Rosas, ‘Annotation of Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council ’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law
Review 797; Francis Snyder, ‘The Gatekeepers: The European Courts and WTO Law’ (2003) 40
Common Market Law Review 313. A notable exception can be found in Grainne de Bu´rca and Joanne
Scott, ‘The Impact of the WTO on EU Decision-Making’ in G. de Bu´rca and J. Scott (eds.), The EU and
the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Hart Publishing, 2003), p. 1.
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institutions towards WTO law, attempt a classiﬁcation on the basis of these
common characteristics, and explore their interdependence. The Court of Justice’s
approach will remain the focus of attention and will form the starting point of the
discussion. It is well established that the Court of Justice has, in principle, denied
the direct eﬀect of WTO law in the Community and Member States’ legal orders.
This approach is best described by the term reactive. The Court, however, has not
always maintained such an approach and, in certain circumstances, has submitted
the Community to the normative control of WTO law. This alternative approach,
which is complemented by legislative initiatives taken by the Community’s politi-
cal institutions, shall be called coactive. The main locus of the third, or proactive,
approach can be found in the activity of the political institutions and the fact that
WTO law has acquired a central role in the shaping of the Union’s internal and
external policies. The critical examination of the political and legal considerations
shaping this categorization will follow, while the impact of the interaction between
the legislature and the judiciary will be reviewed.
2. Reactive approach
The Court of Justice
Introducing the concept of direct eﬀect
The question of direct eﬀect of WTO law forms part of the more general debate of
the reception of general international law in the Community legal order.2 From an
international law point of view, it is clear that international law will prevail in the
case of conﬂict with domestic law.3 However, the determination of whether a
certain provision is directly eﬀective is a matter for domestic law, unless, of course,
the parties to an international agreement have agreed to make its provisions di-
rectly eﬀective.4 Domestic law will also determine the conditions under which a
provision of international law can be directly eﬀective.
Clearly not an invention of the Court of Justice, the deﬁnition of direct eﬀect
is not without controversy. As a preliminary issue, it should be mentioned that
direct eﬀect has appeared in international law under several headings ranging
from direct applicability and self-executing provisions to direct eﬀect.5 In some
of the original Community Member States, belonging predominantly to the
monist legal tradition, international treaties were intended to confer rights on
2 J. M. Prinssen and A. Schrauwen (eds.), Direct Eﬀect: Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine
(Europa Law, 2002).
3 Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
4 Jan Klabbers, ‘ International Law in Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Eﬀect’ (2002)
21 Yearbook of European Law 263; Thomas Cottier, ‘A Theory of Direct Eﬀect in Global Law’ in A. Von
Bogdandy, P. C. Mavroidis and Y. Me´ny (eds.), European Integration and International Co-ordination:
Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus Dieter Ehlermann (Kluwer Law
International, 2002), p. 99 at p. 104.
5 Klabbers, supra note 4 at p. 272.
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individuals.6 In fact, within the Community context, the ‘objective ’ or ‘classic’
deﬁnition of direct eﬀect refers to a legal provision granting rights to individuals
which must be upheld by national courts.7 It has been argued that direct eﬀect not
only provides the norm that governs a given case, it provides, in addition, the
standard for legal review.8 The generic use of the concept of direct eﬀect to include
the standard of review has been particularly popular in the GATT/WTO context,
owing to the participation of Member States in proceedings before the Court for
which the classic deﬁnition of direct eﬀect would clearly have been inadequate.9
Completing the demarcation of the concept of direct eﬀect, one must note the
development of the principle by the Court of Justice in so far as Community law is
concerned. By holding in Van Gend en Loos10 that the Community is a special case
and that the determination of whether Community law can be directly eﬀective
derives from Community law itself,11 the Court recognized the right-conferring
qualities of Community norms in the ‘new legal order’ as a result of which rights
were conferred upon individuals that national courts were bound to protect. The
reference to Van Gend en Loos, while seemingly of limited input to the under-
standing of the concept of direct eﬀect of international/WTO law in the
Community and Member States legal orders, is, it is argued here, of cardinal im-
portance to understand the indoctrination of academic comment by a commu-
nitarized understanding of the concept.12
Generally speaking, several arguments have been brought forward in an attempt
to classify the Community legal order as monist or dualist following the traditional
distinction in international law.13 The Court stated in Haegeman that an inter-
national agreement is an act of the institutions and that the provisions of such an
agreement form an integral part of the Community legal order.14 Immediately re-
ceived as a confession of monism, it was explained in Kupferberg15 that the
meaning attached to the ‘integral part of the Community legal order’ proviso was
that the Member States had not only assumed a responsibility for the fulﬁlment of
6 E. Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2002), at
p. 14.
7 P. Craig and G. de Bu´rca, EU Law: Texts, Cases andMaterials, 3rd edition (Oxford University Press,
2002), at p. 180; T. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, 4th edition (Oxford
University Press, 1998), at p. 187.
8 S. Prechal, Directives in European Community Law (Oxford University Press, 1995), at p. 148.
9 The Court was criticized for connecting legality with direct eﬀect. See, Ulrich Everling, ‘Will Europe
slip on Bananas? The Bananas judgment of the Court of Justice and national courts’ (1996) 33 Common
Market Law Review 401 at p. 421; Fernando Castillo de la Torre, ‘The Status of GATT in EC Law
Revisited’ (1995) 29 Journal of World Trade 53 at p. 58.
10 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport – en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend and Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1.
11 Klabbers, supra note 4 at p. 273.
12 For reasons, it is hoped, that will become clearer towards the end of this analysis.
13 For a general discussion see, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th edition
(Oxford University Press, 2003), at pp. 33–34 and 40–45.
14 Case 181/73 Haegeman v. Belgium [1973] ECR 449 at paras. 4 and 5.
15 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641 at para. 13.
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the agreement towards non-Member States but also towards the Community.
Kupferberg has also been helpful for the elaboration of the criteria laid down by
the Court for a provision of international law to develop direct eﬀect. The Court
added that the nature and structure of an international agreement may prevent an
individual from invoking its provisions before a court in the Community.16 If this
hurdle is overcome, international law provisions are required to be unconditional
and suﬃciently precise in the context of the agreement they form part of.17
Despite the criticism that the criterion concerning the nature and structure of the
agreement received from commentators in the early stages,18 the Court has been
consistent in this requirement.19 The two fundamental cases of International Fruit
(GATT era) and Portuguese textiles (WTO era) will serve to illustrate the Court’s
understanding of the WTO Agreement’s nature and purpose.
The GATT crops: from International Fruit to Bananas
The Court was faced with the GATT for a ﬁrst time in International Fruit in the
course of a preliminary ruling on validity.20 It opined that the Community, not a
GATT Contracting Party, was bound by the GATT Agreement;21 the Court’s own
jurisdiction, however, depended on whether the GATT provisions were capable of
conferring rights on individuals.22 The Court then found that owing to the great
ﬂexibility of the GATT provisions, and, in particular, those conferring the possi-
bility of derogation, including taking safeguard measures when confronted with
exceptional diﬃculties, and the inadequacy of the provisions for the settlement of
the disputes between the Contracting Parties, individuals could not invoke GATT
provisions before national courts.23 Accordingly, because of lack of direct eﬀect,
the Court was unable to examine the validity of the regulations. The Court
maintained its position in subsequent rulings and, despite criticism,24 extended its
ﬁndings to preliminary rulings on interpretation.25
16 Kupferberg at paras. 10–22.
17 Kupferberg at para. 23.
18 Henry G. Schermers, ‘Community Law and International Law’ (1975) 12 Common Market Law
Review 77 at p. 80.
19 Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Swa¨bisch Gmu¨nd [1987] ECR 3719 at para. 14.
20 Joined Cases 21/72 and 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219.
21 The Court refrained from saying that the GATT forms an integral part of the Community legal
order. See, Bourgeois, infra note 153 at p. 103.
22 International Fruit Company at paras. 4–9.
23 Ibid., at para. 27.
24 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Application of the GATT by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities ’ (1983) 20CommonMarket Law Review 397; idem, ‘The EEC as a GATTMember – Legal
Conﬂicts between GATT Law and European Community Law’ in M. Hilf, F. Jacobs and E.-U.
Petersmann, The European Community and the GATT (Kluwer, 1989), pp. 53–59; Kuilwijk, The
European Court of Justice and the GATT Dilemma: Public Interest versus Individual Rights? (Nexed
Editions, 1996).
25 Case 266/81 SIOT [1983] ECR 731; Joined Cases 267/81 and 269/81 SAMI [1983] ECR 801; Case
C-469/93 Chiquita Italia [1995] ECR I-4533.
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Member States had a vested interest in the direct applicability of the GATT
in annulment proceedings before the Court of Justice because they could, in prin-
ciple, challenge measures taken by the Council as GATT inconsistent. Viewed
against the backdrop of qualiﬁed majority voting in the Council in the ﬁeld of
the common commercial policy and taking into account that no individual
rights were involved, this appeared to raise a strong claim before the Court.
The Court of Justice did not entertain this claim. In the ﬁrst Bananas judgment, it
held that:
those features of the GATT, from which the Court concluded that an individual
within the Community cannot invoke it in a court to challenge the lawfulness of a
Community act, also preclude the Court from taking provisions of GATT into
consideration to assess the lawfulness of a regulation in an action brought by a
Member State under the ﬁrst paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.26
In sum, individuals may not invoke GATT law in national courts, even more so
when such legislation is invoked in order to challenge Community law. Neither
can Member States and Community institutions invoke GATT law to challenge
Community law.27 The Court’s thesis, as interpreted at the time in the light of
International Fruit, meant that because the provisions of the GATT do not have
direct eﬀect, they cannot serve as a criterion for legality. With the beneﬁt of
hindsight, it can be argued here28 that the Court meant that the same deﬁning
features of the GATT preclude its provisions from both being invoked by in-
dividuals in national or Community courts and serving as a standard for the review
of legality of secondary Community law.
The WTO advent with Portuguese Textiles
After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
which led to the transformation of the GATT into the WTO, questions concerning
the direct eﬀect of WTO law in the Community legal order started inundating the
Court in the form of requests for preliminary rulings made by national courts.29 In
26 Case C-280/93 Germany v. Council [1994] ECR I-4973 at para. 109. Emphasis added.
27 Piet Eeckhout, ‘The Domestic Legal Status of the WTOAgreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems’
(1997) 34 Common Market Law Review 11 at pp. 24–29.
28 Contra, Eeckhout who argues that the Court simply extended the principle of direct eﬀect to cover
also direct actions for annulment in P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and
Constitutional Foundations (Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 249.
29 Case C-53/96Herme`s International v. FHTMarketing Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603; Case C-183/
95 Aﬃsh v. Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees [1997] ECR I-4315; Case C-147/96Netherlands
v. Commission [2000] ECR I-4723; Case C-106/97 Dutch Antillean Dairy Industry v. Douane-Agenten
[1999] ECR I-5983; Case C-301/97 Netherlands v. Council [2001] ECR I-8853; Joined Cases C-300/98
and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior and Assco Geru¨ste GmbH [2000] ECR I-11037; Case C-377/98
Netherlands v.Council [2001] ECR I-7079; Case C-452/98Dutch Antilles v.Council [2001] ECR I-8973;
Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad [2001] ECR I-5851; Case C-307/99 OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft
[2001] ECR I-3159; Case T-52/99 T-Port v. Commission [2001] ECR II-981; Case T-1/99 T. Port v.
Commission [2001] ECR II-465; Case T-18/99 Bocchi Food Trade v. Commission [2001] ECR II-913.
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most of them, the Court refrained from grasping the nettle30 despite pressure from
academics31 and the encouragement by Advocate Generals (AG)32 to revisit its case
law on the matter. When Portugal brought an action for the annulment of Council
Decision 96/386,33 alleging that it violated certain provisions of the GATT, the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, the Agreement on Import Licensing and gen-
eral principles of Community law,34 the Court was presented with a prime oppor-
tunity for a deﬁnitive resolution of the matter in the light of the new developments.
AG Saggio suggested a change in policy. In his Opinion, after a brief overview of
the WTO agreements relevant to the dispute, the Court’s case law regarding in-
ternational agreements, generally, and the GATT, in particular, the AG held that
only GATT rules must be found directly eﬀective before the legality of Community
acts can be tested against their provisions.35 Faced with the eleventh recital of the
preamble to the Council Decision concluding the WTOAgreement, which declares
that the Agreement and its annexes are not susceptible to direct invocation in
Community or Member States’ courts, the AG, in the light of the relevant pro-
visions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Opinion of
Advocate General Tesauro in Herme`s,36 dismissed its importance as nothing more
than a policy statement which cannot aﬀect the jurisdiction of either the
Community or national courts to interpret and apply the rules contained in the
WTO agreements.37 Consequently, he went on to analyse the novel characteristics
of the WTO system, including the new system for the settlement of disputes, and
argued that the inclusion of a system for the settlement of disputes within the
WTO does not usurp the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to interpret and apply
WTO rules and to annul or sanction any internal measures which might be
contrary to those rules.38 The ﬁnal hurdle, the issue of reciprocity, raised by the
30 Case C-53/96Herme`s International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603 at para. 35;
C-183/95 Aﬃsh v. Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees [1997] ECR I-4315.
31 Pierre Pescatore, ‘Free World Trade and the European Union: The reconciliation of interests and
the revision of dispute resolution procedures in the framework of the WTO’ in Van Kappel and Heusel
(eds.), Free World Trade and the European Union: The Reconciliation of Interests and the Review of the
Understanding on Dispute Settlement in the Framework of the World Trade Organization (Vol 28, Series
of Publications by the Academy of European Law in Trier, Bundesanzeiger, 2000), p. 9.
32 AG Tesauro in Case C-53/96 Herme`s International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV [1998] ECR
I-3603; AG Cosmas in Case C-183/95 Aﬃsh v. Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees [1997] ECR
I-4315.
33 Council Decision of 26 February 1996 concerning the conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding
between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and between the European
Community and the Republic of India on arrangements in the area of market access for textile products
O.J. L 153, 27/6/1996, p. 47. Notably, Portugal had voted against the conclusion of theMemoranda in the
Council; see, Rosas, supra note 1 at p. 801.
34 Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at paras 53 et seq.
35 AG Saggio Opinion in Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at para. 18.
36 AG Tesauro in Case C-53/96 Herme`s International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV [1998] ECR
I-3603 at para. 24.
37 AG Saggio Opinion in Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at para. 20.
38 Ibid., at para. 23.
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fact that no other major trading partner in the WTO had granted direct eﬀect to
WTO law, was dismissed on the basis of the principle in adimplementi non est
adimplendum.39 However, he then held that the obligation to applyWTO law does
not extend to the violation of primary Community law. If WTO law is found to be
in conﬂict with primary Community legislation, the latter should be upheld despite
the risk of the Community suﬀering international responsibility.40
In its judgment, the Court held that:
having regard to their nature and structure, the WTO agreements are not in
principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality
of measures adopted by the Community institutions.41
This statement is foundational of the jurisprudence constante42 of the Court of
Justice denying GATT/WTO law direct eﬀect. Terminologically, it maintained
the broad scope of the concept ‘direct eﬀect ’ to include the eﬀect of WTO law as
a standard of review.43 In order to arrive at this conclusion, the Court started
with the statement from Kupferberg that the parties to an agreement have the
power to determine the eﬀect of the agreement and the means for its implemen-
tation within the parties ’ legal orders; in the absence of an agreement thereon, it is
up to the Court to rule on the matter.44 The Court then juxtaposed the system
established under the WTO Agreement with the GATT and declared that,
although the former diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the provisions of GATT 1947, it still
accords considerable importance to the negotiation between the parties.45 This is
proven by the fact that, while under Article 3.7 DSU measures found inconsistent
with the agreement should be withdrawn, there is a possibility for compensation
and, should this be declined, retaliation against the party whose legislation was
found to be inconsistent with the WTO Agreement.46 The Court then laid down
the two basic considerations for the denial of direct eﬀect, namely the lack of
39 Enshrined in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and meaning that the
failure of one party to observe its obligations under an agreement does not justify the other parties from
applying the agreement among themselves.
40 AG Saggio Opinion in Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at para. 22.
41 Portugal v. Council at para. 47.
42 The case law should be considered settled for all purposes and this is exempliﬁed by the fact that the
Court, following Article 104(3) of its Rules of Procedure, responded to the Finanzgericht Hamburg by
means of an order to the question raised in the context of a case relating to the Bananas litigation. Case
C-307/99OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v.Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen [2001] ECR I-3159.
43 See above. In Joined Cases C-300/98 and C392/98Dior and Assco [2000] ECR I-11344 at para. 44
the Court held: ‘For the same reasons as those set out by the Court in paragraphs 42 to 46 of the judgment
in Portugal v.Council, the provisions of TRIPs, an annex to theWTOAgreement, are not such as to create
rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the courts by virtue of Community law.’
44 Portugal v. Council at paras. 34–35; cf. Kupferberg at paras. 17–18.
45 Portugal v. Council at para. 41. Kuijper mentions that a proposal granting direct eﬀect to the WTO
Agreement brought during the negotiations by the Swiss delegation was rejected. See, Peter Jan Kuijper,
‘The Conclusion and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results by the European Community’ (1995)
6 European Journal of International Law 222.
46 Portugal v. Council supra note 34 at paras. 36–39.
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reciprocity,47 and the freedom of the political institutions.48 The basic argument
behind the principle of reciprocity is that the most important commercial partners
of the Community do not allow their domestic courts to review the legality of their
legislation against WTO law. It distinguished Kupferberg where the principle of
reciprocity was dismissed on the premise that, while the WTO system is based on
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements, the EEC–Portugal FTA
introduced a certain asymmetry of obligations.49 It further held that the grant of
direct eﬀect would lead to disuniform application of WTO rules in the diﬀerent
WTO Members.50 In addition, the freedom of political institutions would be
usurped should the obligation of the Community to comply with theWTO rules be
devolved to the judiciary.51 The Court ﬁnally held that such an interpretation is
consonant with the Council’s view enshrined in the last recital of Council Decision
94/800.52
The principle of reciprocity. With regard to the principle of reciprocity, the
Court essentially held that since the major trading partners of the Community
do not grant direct eﬀect to WTO law, in the interests of the principle of
reciprocity, the Court of Justice was precluded from doing so.53 This was the
ﬁrst time that the Court had resort to the lack of reciprocity in order to deny
granting direct eﬀect to the provisions of an international agreement. Until
that time, the Court referred to the principle in a dismissive manner.54 For in-
stance, in Bresciani, a case concerning the interpretation of the Yaounde´
Convention, the Court introduced the principle only to explain that in the cir-
cumstances governing the Yaounde´ Convention strict reciprocity should not
apply, because of the Community’s intention to assist the development of the
associated countries by granting privileges to them.55 Accordingly, the rights
that the nationals of the parties to the Yaounde´ Convention could invoke in
Member States’ courts were not conditional on reciprocal treatment of
Community citizens in these countries. By juxtaposing these cases with Portugal
v. Council, it may be assumed that the principle of reciprocity constitutes a valid
justiﬁcation for the denial of direct eﬀect in relations between equals and is
not prone to being invoked in international agreements establishing asymmetric
relations.
47 Portugal v. Council at paras. 42–45.
48 Portugal v. Council at paras. 40 and 46.
49 Portugal v. Council at para. 42.
50 Portugal v. Council at para. 45.
51 Portugal v. Council at para. 46.
52 Portugal v. Council at para. 48.
53 Portugal v. Council at para. 43.
54 Kupferberg at para. 18.
55 Case 87/75 Bresciani v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze [1976] ECR 129 at para. 23. This
was mainly a response to the AG Trabucchi’s argumentation on the lack of direct eﬀect.
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The central position of reciprocity in the Court’s denial of direct eﬀect in
Portugal v. Council has not been treated favourably by commentators.56 Eeckhout
pointed out that there are certain inherent asymmetries within the WTO system as
well, citing the examples of the Community as a Customs Union and the prefer-
ential treatment of developing countries within the WTO system.57 Given that it is
not diﬃcult to justify the Court’s position from a pragmatic perspective – the
Community would ﬁnd itself in a particularly disadvantageous position compared
with the USA and Japan – the question is whether the Court’s position is defensible
also from a doctrinal perspective. The asymmetry in the Community’s bilateral
agreements features as an essential element of the design of those agreements. It
expresses the Community’s decision to grant rights under the agreement to third,
usually less developed, countries thereby encouraging trade and the integration of
those countries into the multilateral trading system. In most cases, the substance of
the provisions contained in these agreements replicated those of Community law.58
By contrast, the rights and obligations the Community and its Member States
assumed when founding the WTO constitute a delicate balance, the result of mu-
tually satisfactory concessions arrived at after eight years of negotiations.
Asymmetric application thereof would disturb that balance and undermine the
agreement struck. Accordingly, it was established by the Court in Portugal
v. Council,59 and later clariﬁed in Van Parys,60 that it is in the interest of the
appropriate interpretation and application of WTO law that the Court makes the
grant of direct eﬀect to WTO law subject to the principle of reciprocity.61
The freedom of political institutions. It was established in Portugal v. Council
that the grant of direct eﬀect would compromise the freedom of the
Community’s political institutions within the WTO system. There are two as-
pects of the freedom of the political institutions: ﬁrst, the external aspect, where
the grant of direct eﬀect is destined to weaken the negotiating strength of the in-
stitutions within the WTO in relation to the most important trading partners
and, second, the internal aspect, the shift of the institutional balance in external
trade matters from the Council and the Commission to the Court. The grant of
direct eﬀect would have the consequence that any Community legislative
measure could be challenged before the Court of Justice as WTO incompatible.
56 Inter alia, Stefan Griller, ‘Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union: Annotation
to Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council ’ (2000) 3 Journal of International Economic Law 441.
57 Piet Eeckhout, ‘Judicial Enforcement of WTO Law in the European Union – Some Further
Reﬂections’ (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law 91 at p. 95.
58 Cottier, supra note 4 at p. 108.
59 Portugal v. Council at para. 45.
60 Case C-377/02 Le´on Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie – en Restitutiebureau (BIRB) [2005]
ECR I-1465 at para. 53.
61 Antonis Antoniadis, ‘The Chiquita and Van Parys Judgments: Rules, Exceptions and the Law’
(2005) 32 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 460 at p. 467.
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In this respect, certain considerations relating to EU enlargement and the locus
standi of private parties in annulment proceedings under Article 230 EC are raised.
After UPA,62 the restrictive interpretation of ‘ individual concern’ suggests that the
number of private applicants who satisfy the standing requirements for the chal-
lenge of Community legislation under WTO law will remain small. The impact of
preliminary references on validity under Article 234 EC will be more signiﬁcant as
it can be expected that national courts will seek guidance on questions of WTO
law, the specialized and complex nature of which is unlikely to encourage them to
tackle them themselves. Direct challenges brought by Member States, on the other
hand, are likely to increase because of EU enlargement. Under the Treaty of Nice
rules on qualiﬁed majority voting, as many as 12Member States could form a non-
blocking minority against WTO-related acts adopted ultimately by the Council.63
This makes increased litigation probable with national governments, under
pressure from powerful economic and political lobbies and NGOs, forced to bring
annulment proceedings against potentially WTO-inconsistent acts which they
failed to block in the Council.
The freedom of political institutions should also be examined within the
WTO context. There is no better example to illustrate the considerations at issue
than the EC–Bananas dispute. This dispute, concerning the inconsistency with
WTO rules of the Common Market Organization (CMO) in bananas, ran in
parallel in the WTO dispute settlement system and the Court of Justice.64 The
CMO in bananas, as amended, contained a complex system of quotas and
import licensing procedures favouring traditional and ACP importers of bananas
and has been long viewed as an important development tool. It was unavoidable
that, but for the lack of direct eﬀect, one of the several challenges brought
against the CMO in Community courts would have succeeded and the
Community would have been divested of the possibility of applying for a
preferential regime on imports from ACP countries, a practice which is central
to the Community’s development policy. Assuming that the Community
purports to apply WTO-consistent policies, this is not, in principle, undesirable.
However, at the same time, the Community would have forfeited the facility
to obtain a waiver, a route it actually followed in EC–Bananas.65 Giving
away such an important WTO-legitimate option is like shooting oneself in
the foot. Unlike the argument in Kupferberg where the Court dismissed the
importance of the safeguard clauses in the FTA with Portugal as being too
62 Case C-50/00 P Union de Pequen˜os Agricultores v. Council [2002] ECR I-6677 at para. 44
63 As amended by Article 12 Treaty of Accession. The number will be reduced to ten under the
Constitutional Treaty. See Article I-25(1) Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
64 In the WTO, WT/DS27 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas ; in the Community, numerous annulment, preliminary rulings and Community
liability cases, supra.
65 WT/MIN(01)/15 European Communities – The EC-ACP Partnership Agreement, Decision of
14 November 2001.
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speciﬁc,66 Article IX:3 WTO Agreement represents a possibility for waiving an
obligation under the covered agreements, broadly so conceived. Had the
Court granted direct eﬀect to WTO law, the political institutions’ arms would
have been tied and their authority to negotiate with other WTO Members would
have been frustrated. The side eﬀect this development would have would be to turn
the Court of Justice, rather than the WTO dispute settlement system, into the
principal forum where Community legislation would be challenged. This rep-
resents a disruption not only of the institutional balance between the institutions
of the Community, but also of the institutional framework established by the
WTO.67
Direct eﬀect of Panel and Appellate Body rulings
The conclusion to the previous section indicates that the Court of Justice did not
wish to usurp the function of the WTO bodies to interpret WTO law and review
the consistency of Community acts against its provisions. Would the Court of
Justice be prepared to change its position were it faced with a case where a Panel
and/or the Appellate Body ruled that a Community measure violated WTO law
and consider itself bound by such ruling? The question accordingly is whether,
from a WTO perspective, the Panel and Appellate Body rulings create an obli-
gation to perform in a traditional international law sense and whether domestic
courts are bound by the rulings.68
Before answering this question, it would be useful to analyse the nature and legal
force of DSB recommendations from a WTO perspective. In Japan–Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, at the examination of the bindingness of adopted GATT
panel reports, the Appellate Body held:
Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often
considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among
WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are
relevant to any dispute. However, they are not binding, except with respect to
resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that dispute.69
At this stage, it would be useful to brieﬂy note how a dispute is resolved between
WTOMembers under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). At the ﬁnding
of a violation, the Panel or the Appellate Body shall ‘recommend that the Member
concerned bring the measure into conformity with the agreement ’. In the proper
interpretation of the DSU terms, compliance with the WTO obligation may be
66 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Meinz v. Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641 at para. 21.
67 Conﬁrmed by the Court in the recent Case C-377/02 Le´on Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en
Restitutiebureau (BIRB)[2005] ECR I-1465 at para. 53. See, Antoniadis, supra note 61.
68 John H. Jackson, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding – Misunderstandings on the
Nature of Legal Obligation’ in J. Cameron and K. Campbell (eds.),Dispute Resolution in theWorld Trade
Organisation (Cameron May, London, 1998), pp. 69–74 at p. 74.
69 Appellate Body Report in WT/DS8/AB/R Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (complaint
brought by the EC), at p. 13.
The European Union and WTO law 55
seen as unequivocal, compensation and suspension of concessions being only
temporary alternatives.70 Article 22.1 DSU provides that ‘neither compensation
nor the suspension of concessions or other obligation is preferred to full im-
plementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the
covered agreements ’. In addition to its recommendations, a Panel or the Appellate
Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the
recommendations.71 Panels have been reluctant to recommend speciﬁc ways for
implementation, thereby showing deference to the national margin of manoeuvre
at the implementation of their recommendations72 and illustrating the hypothesis
that compliance may have several variants.73 Commentators, however, support
bindingness beyond the traditional sense and militate in favour of the full eﬀect of
those rulings in the Community legal order.74 Jackson argues that despite their
linguistic shortcomings there are several provisions in the DSU that point towards
the direction of bindingness.75 He does however acknowledge that the US Courts
will not treat them as such, but indicates that these rulings may aﬀect the US
jurisprudence as well as those of other WTO Members.
Regarding the Community legal order, the question of the eﬀect of WTO Panel
and Appellate Body rulings was presented to the Court on several occasions. In the
course of the EC–Bananas litigation, several actions were brought seeking to annul
the CMO in bananas or claim damages invoking the relevant DSB recommend-
ations. The initial approach by the Court of First Instance (CFI) avoided the issue
by narrowing the scope of the Panel and Appellate Body’s ﬁndings and declining
the review of the entire tariﬀ quota system established by the CMO in bananas.76
The Court of Justice later recognized the link between direct eﬀect of WTO pro-
visions and the DSB recommendations, by explaining that DSB decisions estab-
lishing the inconsistency of Community law with the GATT could only have been
taken into consideration should the Court have found the GATT to have direct
70 Jackson, supra note 68.
71 Article 19.1 DSU.
72 Allan Rosas, ‘Implementation and Enforcement of WTO Dispute Settlement Findings: An EU
Perspective’ (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic Law 131 at p. 134. See also, Panel Report in WT/
DS152/R United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974 at para. 7.102.
73 D. Palmeter and P. C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization, Practice
and Procedure, 2nd edition (CUP, 2004), at pp. 295–300. Eeckhout, supra note 57 at p. 93; Rosas supra
note 72 at pp. 135–136.
74 Geert A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The Status of Adopted Panel and Appellate Body Reports in the European
Court of Justice and the European Court of First Instance – The Banana Experience’ (2000) 34 Journal of
World Trade 93; Geert A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The Bed Linen Case and its Aftermath: Some Comments on the
European Community’s ‘‘World Trade Organization Enabling Regulation’’ ’ (2002) 36 Journal of World
Trade 993; N. Lavranos, Decisions of International Organizations in the European and Domestic Legal
Orders of Selected EU Member States (Europea Law Publishing, 2004).
75 Jackson, supra note 68. McNelis arrives at the same conclusion on the basis of the principle of good
faith. See, Natalie McNelis, ‘What Obligations Are Created by World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement Reports?’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 647 at pp. 657–659.
76 Case T-254/97 Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH Chemnitz v. Commission [1999] ECR II-2743 at
para. 26.
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eﬀect.77 In principle, therefore, the eﬀect of DSB recommendations is inextricably
linked with the more general question of direct eﬀect of the WTO Agreement. As a
result, direct eﬀect of DSB recommendations should be excluded.
The question which logically follows is whether, where the Community adopts a
legislative measure in response to adverse DSB recommendations, it could be
construed as doing so in order to implement a particular WTO obligation, thereby
triggering the so-called Nakajima exception, according to which the said legis-
lation can be reviewed against the WTO provisions it is intended to implement.78
The question was initially broached by the CFI in three more ‘bananas’ cases,
Cordis, Bocchi, and T. Port, in which the applicants requested from the CFI to
examine the provisions of Regulation 2362/98 in the light of the WTO Agreement
and, in particular, those provisions that the previous Regulation had been found to
violate. The CFI declined the application of the implementation exception, de-
claring that:
neither the reports of the WTO Panel of 22May 1997 nor the report of the WTO
Standing Appellate Body of 9 September 1997 which was adopted by the Dispute
Settlement Body on 25 September 1997 included any special obligations which
the Commission ‘intended to implement’, within the meaning of the case law, in
Regulation No 2632/98.79
The judgments attracted criticism as a missed opportunity to extend the im-
plementation principle to its proper scope.80 It should be counter-argued however
that this represents the logical consequence of the denial of direct eﬀect to
WTO law.
The Court revisited the issue in Biret,81 a case concerning the claim for non-
contractual liability of the Community for damages suﬀered by Biret because
of the Community’s import ban on hormone-treated beef. The DSB had estab-
lished the inconsistency of the ban with Articles 3.3 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement82
and the Court seemed to respond to the calls from academics and indicate its
readiness to trigger theNakajima exception. In this judgment, the Court conﬁrmed
that the WTO rules are not among those rules in the light of which the Court is to
review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions subject to a
temporal limitation.83 Since the Community had stated that it intended to comply
77 Case C-104/97P Atlanta v. European Community [1999] ECR I-6983 at paras. 19–20. See also,
Case C-307/99OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft v.Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen [2001] ECR I-3159.
78 See below, Section 3.
79 Case T-18/99 Cordis Obst und Gemu¨se Grosshandel v. Commission [2001] ECR II-913 at para.
59; Case T-30/99 Bocchi Food Trade International v. Commission [2001] ECR.II-943 at para 64; Case
T-52/99 T. Port v. Commission [2001] ECR II-981 at para. 59.
80 Eeckhout, supra note 57 at p. 107. See also the criticism launched by Snyder supra note 1 at p. 338.
81 Cases C-93/02 and 94/02 Biret International and Etablissements Biret et Sie [2003] ECR I-10497.
82 WT/DS26 European Communities – Measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones)
(complaint brought by US) ; WT/DS48 European Communities – Measures concerning meat and meat
products (hormones) (complaint brought by Canada).
83 Biret at para. 52.
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with its WTO obligations but that it needed reasonable time to do so and, in fact,
was granted a period of 15 months for that purpose under Article 21.3 DSU, the
Community Courts could not review the legality of the Community measures in
question without rendering ineﬀective the grant of a reasonable period for com-
pliance with the DSB recommendations, as provided by the WTO Agreements.84
This judgment was justiﬁably perceived as having the potential of introducing the
direct eﬀect of DSB recommendations subject to the deadline for their implemen-
tation granted under Article 21.3 DSU having elapsed.85 The implication was that,
after the deadline, the legality of Community measures would be subject to chal-
lenge. In fact, the CFI in Chiquita,86 following the signal given by the Court in
Biret, accepted, in principle, the assumption that, in amending the CMO in
bananas the Community intended to implement the substantive GATT and GATS
obligations it was found to violate.87
The Van Parys judgment, delivered by the Court of Justice one month after the
CFI made its pronouncements in Chiquita, put an end to theoretical discussions on
the scope of the Nakajima exception that would aﬀord direct eﬀect to DSB rec-
ommendations in the Community legal order.88 The question presented to the
Court in Van Parys was whether the WTO agreements give Community nationals
a right to rely on WTO agreements in legal proceedings challenging the validity of
Community legislation, where the DSB has held that both that legislation and
subsequent legislation adopted by the Community in order, inter alia, to comply
with the relevant WTO rules, are incompatible with those rules.89 The Court an-
swered the question in the negative. Faithful to its analysis in Portuguese Textiles,
analyzed above, it laid down the three basic reasons denying direct eﬀect : ﬁrst, the
freedom of the institutions to reach a mutually acceptable solution;90 second, the
principle of reciprocity;91 third, the nature of the rules enshrined in the WTO
dispute settlement system. The third reason is of particular importance for its self-
standing merit and because it informs the ﬁrst two and provides an additional layer
of understanding of the principles analysed above.92 Using the paradigm of the
Community’s bananas regime and the forthcoming resolution of the dispute to
the satisfaction of the Community, the Court undertook an overview of the dispute
and implicitly congratulated the legislature for managing to reconcile the
84 Biret at paras. 61–62.
85 Jochem Wiers, ‘One Day, You’re Gonna Pay: The European Court of Justice in Biret ’ (2004) 31
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 143 at p. 147.
86 Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Chiquita Banana Co. BV and Chiquita Italia,
SpA v. Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-315.
87 Chiquita at para. 127. For a fuller critique see Antoniadis, supra note 61.
88 Case C-377/02 Le´on Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB) [2005]
ECR I-1465.
89 Van Parys at para. 38.
90 Van Parys at paras. 48 and 51.
91 Van Parys at para. 53.
92 See above.
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requirements of the common agricultural policy with the Community’s obligations
towards the ACP states by taking advantage of the room for manoeuvre provided
by the WTO legal system.93 The freedom of the political institutions has been
exercised ‘ in conformity with those rules ’ according to the Court.94 At the same
time, disregard to the principle of reciprocity ‘would risk introducing an anomaly
in the application of the WTO rules ’.95 Accordingly, the freedom of the political
institutions and reciprocity are signiﬁcant, not only from a Community viewpoint
but also as principles leading to the correct application of WTO rules and, in
particular, those enshrined in the DSU.96 The nature of the DSU also makes it
necessary to overturn the Biret judgment in that, even after the lapse of the dead-
line for compliance, there is still room for negotiation in conformity with the DSU
provisions.97
In Van Parys, the Court did not go into the examination of the Nakajima
exception in detail. It simply held that the measures taken by the Community
institutions cannot be interpreted as measures intended to ensure the enforcement
of a particular obligation within the context of the WTO.98 Implementation/
transposition of the WTO Agreements as such should be resorted to after close
examination of all legal, political, and economic considerations. As such, the im-
plementation exception should remain narrow. The ﬁnding by a Panel or the
Appellate Body that a given Community act is inconsistent with the WTO
Agreement creates an obligation which is little diﬀerent to the obligations of the
WTO Members under the provisions of those agreements and, in particular,
Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.99 This general obligation, if taken literally,
would mean that all measures taken by WTOMembers falling within the scope of
the WTO and covered agreements should be treated as aiming at the implemen-
tation of those agreements. While this idea might sound attractive to some, such a
ﬁnding would overrule the Court’s general position concerning direct eﬀect of the
WTO Agreement, and, should the Court wish to maintain consistency in this re-
spect, it must be resisted.
In lieu of a coda to this analysis, it must be pointed out that the Panel and
Appellate Body interpretations have developed an increasing signiﬁcance at the
resolution of disputes in Community Courts. The Court of Justice, as is habitually
the case in relation to rulings by international courts or tribunals,100 resorts to the
93 Van Parys at paras. 49–50.
94 Van Parys at para. 51.
95 Van Parys at para. 53
96 Antoniadis, supra note 61 at p. 467.
97 Van Parys at para. 51.
98 Van Parys at para. 52.
99 ‘Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations, and administrative procedures
with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. ’
100 Allan Rosas, ‘With a Little Help from My Friends: International Case law as a Source of
Reference for the EU Courts’ (2005) 5 The Global Community Yearbook of International Law and
Jurisprudence 203.
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interpretations granted by the WTO bodies in the exercise of its general duty to
interpret Community law as far as possible consistently with international law.101
Non-contractual liability of the Community
Several cases have been brought to the Community Courts by aﬀected banana
traders requesting compensation from the Community for damages suﬀered. For
the Community to incur liability, a number of conditions must be met. There must
be an unlawful act imputable to the Community, damage to the applicant, and the
existence of a causal link between the unlawful act and the damage suﬀered.102 It is
settled case law that, for the unlawful conduct condition, a suﬃciently serious
breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals must be estab-
lished.103 It is therefore obvious that the question of Community liability is inex-
tricably linked with the issue of direct eﬀect. In the absence of direct eﬀect, the
Community courts have consistently denied any right to damages,104 as for the
Community to incur liability all conditions must be met.105
It has been suggested, making the analogy with Francovich, that direct eﬀect is
not necessary for the award of damages.106 This argument can be sourced to the
deﬁnition of direct eﬀect and the attempt to treat direct eﬀect and the creation of
rights for individuals as non-synonymous concepts,107 thereby overlooking the
deﬁning characteristic of directives which are, in principle, capable of conferring
rights on individuals. Those rights can simply not be enforced against other in-
dividuals in national courts because of the absence of horizontal eﬀect of direc-
tives.108 In Francovich, because the directives at issue were capable of granting
rights to individuals and the remaining conditions were fulﬁlled, damages
were awarded. By contrast, the Court’s decision to deny liability to the aﬀected
traders for damages suﬀered in violation of WTO law makes perfect sense. The
101 Case C-245/02Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Bude˘jovicky` Budvar, na´rodnı´ podnik [2004] ECR I-10989.
For a fuller analysis see Section 3.
102 Case 5/71 Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Scho¨ppenstedt v. Council [1971] ECR 975.
103 Case C-352/98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v. Commission [2000] ECR I-5291 at para. 42.
104 Case T-18/99 Cordis Obst und Gemu¨se Grosshandel v. Commission [2001] ECR II-913; Case
T-30/99 Bocchi Food Trade International v. Commission [2001] ECR.II-943; Case T-52/99 T.Port v.
Commission [2001] ECR II-981; Case C-104/97P Atlanta AG and others v. Commission and Council
[1999] ECR I-6983; Cases C-93/02 and 94/02 Biret International and Etablissements Biret et Sie [2003]
ECR I-10497.
105 Case C-146/91 KYDEP v. Council and Commission [1994] ECR I-4199; Joined Cases T-198/95,
T-171/96, T-230/97, T-174/98 and T-225/99Comafrica and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe [2001] ECR II-1975
at para. 134.
106 Birgit Schoißwohl, ‘The ECJ’s Atlanta Judgment: Establishing a Principle of Non-Liability?’ in
F. Breuss, S. Griller and E. Vranes (eds.), The BananaDispute: An Economic and Legal Analysis (Research
Institute for European Aﬀairs, Springer, 2003), p. 309.
107 Jochem Wiers, ‘One Day, You’re Gonna Pay: The European Court of Justice in Biret ’ (2004) 31
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 143 at p. 148.
108 See Case C-6/90 Francovich and others v. Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357 at para. 27, Case
152/84Marshall v. Southampton and SW Hampshire Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 723 at para. 48
and their progeny.
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Court’s analysis on direct eﬀect of WTO law makes clear that the WTO
Agreement is not, in principle, capable of granting any rights to individuals.109
Therefore, individuals cannot have an entitlement to a certain level of tariﬀ, quota,
or any speciﬁc treatment by anyWTOMember110 and such treatment cannot cause
damage to them.
The established position was put in doubt after Biret. In this well-known judg-
ment, the Court opined that a review of legality of Community law cannot be
undertaken in the context of an action for damages under Article 235 EC while the
deadline for compliance with the DSB recommendations under Article 21.3 had
not yet expired.111 The unavailability of a damages claim against the Community in
Community Courts was extended by the CFI in Chiquita until the end of the
dispute in the WTO, particularly so, when the Community was subject to retali-
ation under Article 22 DSU.112 Linked with the preceding analysis on the eﬀect of
Panel and Appellate Body rulings, these two judgments read together
meant – Chiquita more explicitly so – that when the Community adopted legis-
lation so as to comply with adverse DSB recommendations, the aﬀected private
parties could claim compensation for damages suﬀered as a result of the measure
at issue subject to the proceeding under WTO dispute settlement having been
terminated. This proposition is based on the theoretical assumption that the im-
plementation exception can apply when the WTO has ruled on the matter.
Following Van Parys, which explained that when the Community amends its
legislation in order to comply with adverse DSB recommendations it cannot be
presumed to intend to implement any particular obligation under the WTO
Agreements, the foundation of this reasoning is overturned.113 Indeed, since the
implementation exception does not apply, the subsequent construction of the
Community Courts in Biret and Chiquita cannot stand.
The ruling inVan Parys lessened the anxiety over the long-awaited judgments by
the CFI in FIAMM.114 These cases concerned traders who had suﬀered damages
not as a direct result of WTO-incompatible Community legislation but because
they were subject to retaliation by another WTO Member. Are those traders en-
titled to any compensation? The CFI, based on the previous case law, held that the
Community cannot, in principle, be held liable by reason of any infringement of
109 For a thoughtful analysis see Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Legal Eﬀects of World Trade Organization
Decisions Within European Union Law: A Contribution to the Theory of the Legal Acts of International
Organizations and the Action for Damages Under Article 288(2) EC’ (2005) 39 Journal of World
Trade 45.
110 Rosas, supra note 72 at p. 140. Pieter Jan Kuijper and Marco Bronckers, ‘WTO Law in the
European Court of Justice’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 1313 at p. 1332. Also, Cordis at
para. 51.
111 Biret at para. 62.
112 Chiquita at para. 166.
113 Van Parys at para. 41.
114 Joined Cases T-69/00 T-301/00, T-320/00, T-383/00 and T-135/01 FIAMM and FIAMM
Technologies and others v. Council and Commission, judgment of 14 December 2005, not yet reported.
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WTO rules by the Community institutions.115 This could only be the case if the
Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context
of the WTO or where the Community measure expressly refers to speciﬁc pro-
visions of the WTO.116 Mirroring the substance of Van Parys, yet, not citing it, the
CFI held that by amending legislation found to be incompatible with WTO rules,
the Community did not intend to implement speciﬁc obligations arising from those
rules.117 Neither, did the relevant Community legislation make express reference to
speciﬁc WTO rules.118
The seemingly insurmountable insulation of Community law against any chal-
lenge under WTO in Community Courts would make the analysis of the other
conditions of liability, namely the damage and the causal link between the act of
the institutions and damage suﬀered, redundant. Yet, the CFI in FIAMMwas faced
with a claim to examine the non-contractual liability of the Community for the
lawful conduct of the Community institutions drawing on national laws of the
Member States. In fact, the CFI found that national laws enable individuals to
obtain compensation for damages suﬀered even in the absence of unlawful con-
duct by the perpetrator.119 Following Dorsch Consult, the CFI held that the
Community could incur liability in the absence of unlawful conduct if actual
damage has been sustained, the causal link between that damage and the conduct
of Community institutions has been established, and that damage was of unusual
and special nature.120 The claim made by the applicants in FIAMM presented a
prime opportunity to the CFI to examine the issue of damages and causal link,
which, owing to the hurdle of direct eﬀect, was hardly broached in the Court’s case
law in the area of WTO law.121
Starting from the nature and extent of damages, the CFI simply stated that the
applicants must have necessarily suﬀered commercial damage by reason of the
incontestable rise in the price of their products, resulting from the imposition of an
additional duty of 96.5%.122 Straightforward as it is, this statement is not con-
vincing. Clearly, damage in this context includes the damage actually suﬀered plus
any lost proﬁts.123 The emphasis on actually suﬀered runs counter to the pre-
sumption ‘must have necessarily suﬀered’.124 Accordingly, in this context, dam-
ages should not be calculated on the basis of the amount by which the tariﬀs at
the imports of Community products have increased by virtue of the suspension of
concessions applied by the complaining WTO Member, but the actual eﬀect the
115 FIAMM at para. 113.
116 FIAMM at para. 114.
117 FIAMM at para. 137.
118 FIAMM at para. 144.
119 FIAMM at para. 159.
120 FIAMM at para. 160.
121 With the exception of the manifest lack of causality in Biret at paras. 63–64.
122 FIAMM at para. 168.
123 Cases 5, 7, 13-24/66 Kampﬀmeyer v. Commission [1967] ECR 245.
124 FIAMM at para. 168.
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raise of tariﬀs has had upon the competitive position of the aﬀected traders. In this
respect, the CFI’s presumption will be diﬃcult to apply in cases of traders like
Louis Vuitton whose sales of leather handbags recorded a surge in the US market
despite the sanctions.125
Going on to the issue of causal link, the CFI, referring to previous case law,
established that causality exists when there is a suﬃciently direct causal nexus
between the conduct of the Community institutions and the damage suﬀered.126
While the CFI recognized the option available to the United States to settle the
dispute, it nonetheless explained that ‘ the withdrawal of concessions in relation to
the Community results objectively, in accordance with the normal foreseeable
operation of the WTO dispute settlement system accepted by the Community’.127
The unilateral act by the United States to increase the customs duties on imports of
batteries does not, in the CFI’s view, break the causal link. In the CFI’s words, the
damage suﬀered by the applicants ‘must be regarded as the immediate cause’ of
the Community conduct.128
Two objections must be raised against the CFI’s reasoning in this respect : ﬁrst, it
provided a very broad interpretation of the concept of the ‘direct causal link’. In
the light of the large number of steps between the Community breach of WTO law
and the damage suﬀered by an individual trader as a result of a WTO Member’s
suspension of concessions,129 it ought to be questioned how immediate and direct
such a causal relationship is. Extrapolating the conditio sine qua non theoretical
foundation of causality to other areas of Community law is likely to change the
landscape of Community liability as at the moment it sits uncomfortably with it.130
In fact, it is questionable how the CFI considers the causal link broken in a case in
which the Community institutions enjoy no discretion at the adoption of the
harmful act,131 while the opposite is the case for discretionary acts of other WTO
Members.132 Second, the CFI’s analysis seems to disregard its previously vigorously
advocated thesis on the great ﬂexibility of the WTO DSU provisions. Indeed,
there is a logical error here as, if the ﬂexibility of the DSU is as great as the CFI
has repeatedly stated, the relationship between the conduct of the Community
institutions and the damage suﬀered by the individual traders could not be
125 While this raise has been attributed to either smart management, see, for instance, Ashok Som,
‘Personal touch that built an empire of style and luxury’ available at http://www.ashoksom.com/
3-Personal-touch%20.pdf, at p. 8 or American consumers’ increasing demand for luxury products, see,
for instance, http://www.vivavocefashion.com/front_page.html/retail_news2001_04.html, no study as-
sesses the competitive position of Louis Vuitton in the absence of sanctions.
126 FIAMM at para. 178 and the case law mentioned there.
127 FIAMM at para. 183.
128 FIAMM at para. 185.
129 Article 3.7 DSU. Rosas, supra note 72 at p. 140.
130 See, inter alia T-184/95 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v. Council of the European
Union and Commission of the European Communities [1998] ECR II-667 at paras. 70–74.
131Dorsch Consult at para. 72.
132 FIAMM at para. 184. See also, Kuijper supra note 110 at p.1337 who anticipates the problem.
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characterized as either ‘ immediate’ or ‘direct ’. With regard to the suspension of
concessions, it should be pointed out here that in the light of recent disputes, even
in the presence of DSB authorization, WTOMembers have been reluctant to apply
retaliatory measures.133 Therefore, the imposition of additional duties on products
originating in the EC can hardly qualify as ‘the normal foreseeable operation of
the WTO dispute settlement system’.134
Damage will be of an unusual nature, held the CFI in FIAMM, when it exceeds
the limits of the economic risks inherent in operating the sector concerned and of
special nature when it aﬀects a particular circle of economic operators in a dis-
proportionate manner by comparison with other operators.135 In light of the nature
of international trade, the CFI had little diﬃculty dismissing the claim brought by
the applicants that they suﬀered damage of an unusual nature and exercised
judicial economy on the question of special nature.136
Whilst a full critique of the FIAMM judgment escapes the conﬁnes of this con-
tribution, it must be stated here that it sends mixed messages. The CFI correctly
followed the established case law ruling out Community liability because of the
lack of direct eﬀect. It is submitted, however, that it erred in embarking on the
analysis of Community liability for lawful conduct. Even if such a principle can
ﬁnd suﬃcient support in the cited judgments and national law,137 its operation
could not be seen as an alternative remedy when the unlawfulness of the acts of the
Community institutions cannot be established because of the absence of direct
eﬀect. In addition, ‘actual damage’ and ‘direct causal link’ do not warrant such
broad interpretations. It could be assumed that the CFI’s analysis is revealing of
the collective mindset of its members and potential disagreements regarding the
continued Community Courts’ reactive approach. In sum, this approach denies
liability to private traders for damages suﬀered as a result of unlawful or lawful
Community acts in the WTO domain.
As a precursor to the discussion on the coactive approach, it should be
pointed out that the discussion concerning the conditions for Community
liability maintains its signiﬁcance. That is because Community liability may apply
in these cases. As will be demonstrated in detail below, the Community applies a
communitarized version of WTO law in the context of the coactive approach. It
could be argued in this respect that communitarization of, say, the WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement vests this Agreement with the constitutional qualities of
133WT/DS108 United States – Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations; WT/DS136 United
States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916; WT/DS222 Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for
Regional Aircraft.
134 FIAMM at para. 183.
135 FIAMM at para. 202.
136 FIAMM at para. 212.
137 FIAMM at paras. 158–160. See also, T-184/95 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH
v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [1998] ECR II-667 at
para. 77.
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Community law, including direct eﬀect. By contrast, it could also be argued that
since WTO law is not capable of conferring rights on individuals, the content of
the exception created by the Court should only be construed to include the inci-
dental review of legality of the Community measures under WTO law in annul-
ment proceedings, but not to establish a claim for Community liability.138 It must
be pointed out however that the Court is not likely to deal with the issue because of
the dual avenue available to traders to enforce their rights in Community Courts
and the WTO Dispute Settlement and the measures taken by the institutions to
minimize such an eventuality.139
The political institutions
In the reactive approach, the political institutions showed resistance towards the
full eﬀect of WTO law. The most characteristic example of a reactive approach by
the Council is the very inclusion in the preamble to its decision concluding the
WTO Agreement of a clause stating that ‘Whereas, by its nature, the Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization, including the Annexes thereto, is not
susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts ’.140
The Council, in this instance, was acting within its powers as duly recognized by
the Court141 and this statement should be considered of cardinal importance, de-
spite the Opinion to the contrary by Advocate General Saggio in Portuguese
Textiles.142
In addition, the political institutions have adopted a reactive approach in speciﬁc
instances, primarily concerning those cases where they chose to maintain measures
reﬂecting fundamental policy choices despite adverse Panel and Appellate Body
rulings. This stance has been particularly important in the foundational years of
the WTO and tested the limits of the system. At the same time, it tested the
Community’s own limits as an idiosyncratic actor within this system.143
3. Coactive approach
The Court of Justice
In the reactive approach towards WTO law, the Court of Justice denied the en-
forcement of WTO law in national and Community Courts and the review of
138 Contra, Wiers, supra note 85 at p. 148, who makes a distinction between the conferral of rights on
individuals and direct eﬀect.
139 See below, Section 3. Also, Antonis Antoniadis, ‘The Participation of the European Community in
the World Trade Organisation: An External Look at European Union Constitution-Building’ in
T. Tridimas and P. Nebbia (eds.), EU Law for the 21st Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order, Vol. I
(Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 321 at pp. 340–343.
140 Council Decision 94/800 of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the
European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the
Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986–1994), O.J. L 336, 23/12/1994, p. 1.
141 Kupferberg at para. 17.
142 AG Saggio Opinion in Case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 at para. 20.
143 Antoniadis, supra note 139 at pp. 343–344.
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secondary Community law against its provisions. However, as already implied in
the course of the analysis of the Portuguese Textiles, there are clearly deﬁned
exceptions recognized by the Court. These exceptions can be classiﬁed as: the
legality standard, the transposition/implementation, the clear reference, and the
consistent interpretation.144 The exceptions partly reﬂect the Court’s response to
action by the Community’s political institutions showing inclination to include
the application of or reference to WTO law in their activities, and partly the
realization that, in some cases, judicial enforcement of WTO rules in the
Community and national Courts serves the better application of these rules and
furthers the WTO objectives. The term ‘coactive’ in this sense does not simply
represent a notable deviation from the lack of direct eﬀect doctrine, it also signiﬁes
the intention of the institutions to use WTO law in their activities alongside
Community law.
Legality standard
Under Article 300(7) EC, the conclusion of the WTO Agreement by the
Community bears the consequence that both the Community and its Member
States must observe its provisions. The legality standard exception aims to enable
the Community to hold the Member States to their commitments. As stated in
Kupferberg :
In ensuring respect for commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the
Community institutions the Member States fulﬁl an obligation not only in re-
lation to the non-member country concerned but also and above all in relation to
the Community which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the
agreement. That is why the provisions of such an agreement, as the Court has
already stated in its judgment of 30 April 1974 in case 181/73 Haegeman (1974)
ECR 449, form an integral part of the Community legal system.145
The Court underlined here the functional considerations present in the fulﬁlment
of the Community’s international obligations and the aim to avoid incurring in-
ternational responsibility.146 Premised upon the need to establish a uniﬁed front,
which should not be undermined by Member States’ breach of the Community’s
international commitments, and supported by the principle of cooperation and
Article 300(7) EC, the Community can coerce Member States to fulﬁl their
obligations under international agreements. There is no issue of direct eﬀect here,
simply an unconditional obligation incumbent on Member States every time the
Community concludes an international agreement. It ﬂows from the unique
position of the Community assuming its own obligations on the international
plane, a consequence of the fact that it has been granted with legal personality to
144 I prefer the terms ‘transposition’ and ‘clear reference’ adopted by Snyder, supra note 1 at p. 342
over the ‘indirect eﬀect ’ terminology proposed by Eeckhout, supra note 27 at p. 40.
145 Kupferberg at para. 13.
146 Klabbers, supra note 4 at p. 281.
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be able to invoke the mechanisms available at Community level in order to ensure
that the Member States observe their obligations under the Treaties.
Accordingly, when the Commission considers that Member States violate their
obligations under the WTO Agreement, it may invoke enforcement proceedings in
order to bring the recalcitrant Member States back to order. In the ordinary in-
terpretation of Article 226 EC, Member States’ failure to fulﬁl their obligations
under the Treaty includes also obligations assumed by the Community in the
WTO.WTO rules become the Community legal standard by whichMember States
must abide. This obligation stems from the nature of the Community as a Customs
Union under the GATT, which demands that each Contracting Party shall take
such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the
provisions of the GATT Agreement by the regional and local governments and
authorities within its territories.147 Given that the Community was perceived as a
single Contracting Party in the GATT,148 the whole meaning of regional inte-
gration arrangements within the international trading system would be frustrated
should the Community be unable to use the means available to it in order to
enforce compliance with the GATT provisions.149
The most important case under the legality standard exception is the
International Dairy Agreement (IDA).150 In that case, the Commission requested
the Court to declare that, by authorizing the importation of dairy products at a
customs value lower than the minimum price provided by the IDA, an agreement
annexed to the Tokyo Round of Multilateral trade negotiations conducted under
the GATT, Germany failed to fulﬁl its obligations under the Treaty. The Court
obviated the examination of whether the Commission had the right to bring pro-
ceedings against a Member State under the GATT, and, on the facts of the case,
had little diﬃculty in concluding that Germany was in violation of the Annexes to
the IDA. In order to arrive at this conclusion the Court had to overcome diﬃcult
hurdles. The most important was the claim by Germany, taken up by Advocate
General Tesauro in his Opinion,151 that the Community legislation on inward
processing relief was in violation of the IDA too. The Court asserted the duty of
consistent interpretation and held that the relevant Council Regulation could be
interpreted in conformity with the IDA.152
This judgment has attracted criticism as it seemingly promotes inconsistency
and, possibly, also an imbalance between the rights and obligations of the Member
States. It was argued that allowing the Commission to challenge a Member State
measure for violation of the GATT, while at the same time denying a Member
State the corollary right of challenge in annulment proceedings, ‘ is on balance not
147 Article XXIV:12 GATT.
148 Article XXIV:1 GATT.
149 In this case Article 226 EC Treaty.
150 Case C-61/94 Commission v. Germany (International Dairy Agreement) [1996] ECR I-3989.
151 AG Tesauro’s Opinion in International Dairy Agreement at para. 24.
152 International Dairy Agreement at para. 57.
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satisfactory, if one considers that the two situations are comparable ’.153 Clearly,
the situations are not comparable. Had the Commission or any other institution
been permitted to apply for the annulment of Community legislation, while the
Member States had not, it would have been a comparable yet untenable position.
However, the diﬀerent treatment of qualitatively diﬀerent proceedings (annulment
in Portuguese Textiles and enforcement in IDA) can be reconciled. First, what is at
stake in annulment proceedings is the fulﬁlment of an EC obligation vis-a`-vis the
GATT/WTOwhilst in enforcement proceedings the fulﬁlment of an obligation of a
Member State vis-a`-vis the EC. As a result, in both cases, the Community upholds
EC law over international law or national law. This seems to remedy the alleged
inconsistency154 and raises the question of the supremacy of the Community legal
order, which will be dealt with below.155 In addition, the Court’s statement in
Haegeman, regarding international law forming an integral part of the
Community legal order,156 is vindicated in that WTO law will be applied in en-
forcement proceedings.157
More recently, the Court condemned Ireland for failing to adhere to the 1971
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.158 Unlike
IDA, which concerned compliance with an agreement concluded by the
Community, it is not Community membership that provides the cause of action in
this case, since the Community is not a party to the Berne Convention. The Berne
Convention is, in principle, binding on the Community indirectly by virtue of
Article 9 of the TRIPs Agreement in accordance with which the Community, as a
WTO Member bound by all covered agreements, is obliged to aﬀord the level of
copyright protection enshrined in the Convention to all other WTO Members.
Curiously, the TRIPS Agreement is not mentioned at all but, instead, Article 5 of
Protocol 28 to the EEA Agreement, which obliges the parties to the EEA to adhere
to the Berne Convention.159
Transposition/Implementation
In the following aspect of the coactive approach, the Community is re-
quired to act in conformity with WTO law insofar as it has adopted
measures intended to implement certain of its provisions. This is the so-called
‘transposition’/‘ implementation’ exception in accordance with which in-
dividuals may invoke WTO law in order to challenge incompatible Community
153 Bourgeois, ‘The European Court of Justice and the WTO’ in Weiler, J. H. H. (eds.), The
EU, The WTO and the NAFTA (Oxford University Press, 2001), at p. 112. See also, AG Tesauro’s
Opinion in International Dairy Agreement at paras. 23–24. More recently, Bronckers, supra note 110
at pp. 1348–1349.
154 Ibid. at pp. 112–113.
155 See Section 5.
156 Case 181/73 Haegeman v. Belgium [1973] ECR 449 at paras. 4 and 5.
157 See also, Rosas, supra note 100 at p. 218.
158 Case C-13/00 Commission v. Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943.
159 Ibid., at para. 20.
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acts.160 While, in principle, the transposition exception may apply generally in all
areas of Community legislation falling within the scope of WTO law, it must be
pointed out that its application has been limited to the ﬁeld of Anti-Dumping.161
The foundational case for this exception isNakajima.162 In that case, Nakajima,
a Japanese company importing serial-impact dot matrix printers into the
Community, applied for the annulment of Regulation 3651/88 imposing deﬁnitive
anti-dumping duties on its imported products. Nakajima claimed that the duties
were in violation of certain provisions of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code and
sought to rely on those in order to achieve the annulment of the Regulation. The
Council argued that, as with the GATT, the Anti-Dumping Code does not confer
on individuals rights which may be relied on before the Court and that the pro-
visions of that Code are not directly applicable within the Community.163 The
Court accepted that at the adoption of Council Regulation 2423/88 (the Basic
Antidumping Regulation at the time) the Community intended to implement the
international commitments stemming from the GATT Anti-Dumping Code. The
Community must therefore ensure compliance with its international obligations at
the adoption of implementing measures. Thus, the legality of Regulations im-
posing anti-dumping duties should be examined against the provisions of the
GATT Anti-Dumping Code.164
The Court of Justice conﬁrmed the validity of the Nakajima doctrine in the
WTO context in Petrotub,165 a case that concerned the imposition of anti-dumping
duties on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloy steel
originating in Romania. It explained, again in the context of anti-dumping, that
since the Community, pursuant to the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation, intended
to transpose the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), the Court may review
the legality of Community measures in the ﬁeld of anti-dumping under the ADA.
The Court went even further to explain that those rules being subsumed within the
Community legal system attract the application of an additional layer of protec-
tion prescribed by this system, in that case Article 253 EC Treaty on the obligation
to provide reasons. The implication which ﬂows is that the ADA provisions in
question shall be treated qua Community law. The Court then laid down an ad-
ditional implication: the requirement to state reasons in that particular case should
be interpreted in the context of anti-dumping, namely the procedure provided in
Article 2.4.2 ADA and the Commission’s undertakings assumed within the WTO
Committee on Anti-Dumping,166 thereby fully fusing the two legal systems in the
context of anti-dumping.
160 Eeckhout supra note 27 at p. 56 uses the term ‘implementation’ instead of ‘transposition’.
161 Chiquita at para. 120.
162 Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v. Council [1991] ECR I-2069.
163Nakajima at para. 27.
164Nakajima at paras. 31–32.
165 Case C-76/00P Petrotub SA and Republica SA v. Council [2003] ECR I-79 at paras. 54–60.
166 Petrotub at para. 59.
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The Nakajima doctrine establishes that the Court may review the legality of
Community legislation against WTO law. The Court’s jurisdiction to deal with
such matters does not only equip aﬀected parties with substantive arguments
stemming from the ADA but also establishes the possibility that parallel proceed-
ings may be instituted challenging the same Community legislation both before the
Court of Justice andWTO dispute settlement. In the EC–Bed Linen case,167 a Panel
and the Appellate Body had the opportunity to examine the conformity of Council
Regulation 2398/97 imposing deﬁnitive anti-dumping duties on cotton bed linen
originating in India with the ADA. In its Report, the Panel concluded that the said
Regulation violated certain provisions of the ADA.168 The Community appealed
the Panel ﬁndings, and, while the Appellate Body reversed some of the Panel’s
conclusions, it maintained that the ‘zeroing’ methodology,169 applied by the EC, is
inconsistent with Article 2.4.2. ADA.170
The EC–Bed Linen dispute raises important questions regarding the impact of
WTO bodies’ interpretations in the Community legal order,171 also in connection
with the preceding discussion of direct eﬀect of Panel and Appellate Body
rulings.172 Following the facts of the EC–Bed Linen case, what will the Court of
Justice do when faced with a complaint against the ‘zeroing’ methodology in-
consistency with Article 2.4.2 ADA? In principle, the Court has jurisdiction to
decide the issue anyway; nonetheless, the timing of the parallel proceedings raises
several possibilities. If the dispute is still pending in the WTO, the Court could, if
it ﬁnds inconsistency with the ADA, deprive those proceedings of their subject
matter by annulling the Regulation. Equally, it may decide that the ‘zeroing’
methodology is consistent with the ADA. In both cases, it can also stay its pro-
ceedings in anticipation of the Panel and Appellate Body rulings.173 Staying the
proceedings should be the least preferred option; since the Court has jurisdiction
to assess the legality of Anti-Dumping Regulations against the ADA, it should
exercise it. A ﬁnding of consistency by the Court of the ‘zeroing’ methodology
with the ADA, followed by a contrasting ﬁnding by the WTO bodies shifts
to the Community institutions the responsibility to comply with the DSB rec-
ommendations and remedy the situation as they would have done in the absence
167 WT/DS141 European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed
Linen from India (complaint by India).
168 WT/DS141/R.
169 In the calculation of the dumping margin the Community applied the following methodology:
First, it divided the Indian bedlinen into several categories. In some, the export price was lower than the
normal price and in some it was higher, the later being called a ‘negative dumping margin’. Then, it
calculated the average dumping margin calculating the negative dumping margins as zero. Obviously, the
‘zeroing’ methodology resulted into a higher dumping margin.
170 WT/DS141/AB/R.
171 See, Natalie McNelis, ‘What Obligations Are Created by World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement Reports?’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 647.
172 Section 2.
173 Bourgeois, supra note 153 at 121 citing K. P. E. Lasok, The European Court of Justice, Practice
and Procedure, 2nd edition (Butterworth, London, 1994), at p. 72.
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of a judgment by the Court. When the WTO has dealt with the ﬁrst issue, it should
be conceded that the Court of Justice should accept the legal interpretations found
in the DSB recommendations. In this respect, they could be treated as directly
eﬀective. The ensuing inconsistency that the direct eﬀect of only certain Panel
and Appellate Body rulings is recognized is methodologically sound. The fact
that only certain WTO provisions may be directly eﬀective in the Community legal
order once transposed, necessitates that the interpretations given by the bodies
entrusted with the task of providing security and predictability to the system
should follow.
In the aftermath of EC–Bed Linen, the Council was faced with the possibility
of actions for annulment before the Court of Justice by traders against whose
imports the same ‘zeroing’ methodology had been applied. As mentioned above,
the Court would be expected to apply the interpretations contained in the
Panel and Appellate Body Reports, annul the Regulations ex tunc, and require
the reimbursement of the collected duties. In response, the Council adopted
the Enabling Regulation174 whose provisions shall be analysed below.175
Suﬃce it to say here that it requires the Council to take the necessary measures
to bring Community acts in conformity with the rulings provided in the DSB
recommendations. The Enabling Regulation provides prospective remedies and
expressly states the intention to avoid the reimbursement of the collected
duties.176 The interest of the Council in pre-empting the Court of Justice’s
jurisdiction oﬀers strong evidence in favour of the argument that in the ﬁeld of
Anti-Dumping and Subsidies, the Panel and Appellate Body Reports are directly
eﬀective.
The recognition of direct eﬀect in areas falling within the transposition/
implementation exception means that the infringement of WTO law will readily
establish a suﬃciently serious breach that will trigger Community liability.177
However, in the circumstances of EC–Bed Linen, a claim for compensation, while
legally possible, is unlikely to succeed. As mentioned above, traders have a dual
avenue to enforce their rights under the ADA. In addition, it could be argued that
WTO law falling within the scope of the Nakajima exception, whilst allowing
incidental review of legality, does not grant rights to individuals. Finally, it would
be diﬃcult to argue that in, for instance, applying the ‘zeroing’ methodology at the
calculation of the dumping margin – a common practice internationally in the ﬁeld
174 Council Regulation (EC) No 1515/2001 on the measures that maybe taken by the Community
following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dumping and anti-
subsidies matters O.J. L 201, 26/07/2001, p. 10. Hereinafter, the Enabling Regulation. McNelis, supra
note 171 at p. 670.
175 See below.
176 Article 3 Enabling Regulation.
177 Case C-5/94 R v.Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR
I-2553 at para. 28.
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of anti-dumping – the Community has manifestly and gravely disregarded the
limits of its discretion.178
Clear reference
The Court conﬁrmed in Portuguese Textiles and subsequent cases that,
where a Community measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the
WTO agreements, the Court may review the legality of the Community measure
in question in the light of those WTO rules.179 The Court was referring to
Fediol, a judgment delivered during the GATT era, which established this
exception and laid down the conditions for its application.180 In that case, the
association of Seed Crushers and Oil Processors brought a complaint before
the Commission requesting the latter to initiate, on the basis of the New
Common Commercial Policy Instrument,181 proceedings against certain alleged
illicit commercial practices employed by Argentina. Fediol claimed that
those practices were in violation of certain provisions of the GATT. Following
an investigation, the Commission concluded that there was no violation and
Fediol applied to the Court for the annulment of the Commission’s decision.
The Commission based its defence of inadmissibility on the argument that
GATT has no direct eﬀect. The Court however held that it cannot be inferred
from the lack of direct eﬀect that ‘citizens may not, in proceedings before
the Court, rely on the provisions of GATT in order to obtain a ruling on
whether conduct criticized in a complaint lodged under Article 3 of Regulation
No 2641/84 constitutes an illicit commercial practice within the meaning of
that Regulation.’182 The gist of the ruling is that, irrespective of the lack of
direct eﬀect, the Commission, at the exercise of its discretion on whether to
pursue a complaint under the GATT Dispute Settlement, has to interpret the
relevant GATT provisions. This should not preclude the private parties having
an interest and being involved in the procedure from requesting the judicial re-
view of the Commission’s decision. In essence, since the Commission possesses
the prerogative of interpretation of the GATT for the purposes of initiating a
GATT/WTO complaint it should not then hide behind the lack of direct eﬀect of
the GATT.183 It is preferable that review of its decision be available to interested
parties.
178 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Peˆcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029 vat
para. 55; Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94, C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others
v. Germany [1996] ECR I-4845 at para. 25.
179 Portugal v. Council at para. 49; Biret at para. 53.
180 Case 70/87 Fediol v. Commission [1989] ECR 1825.
181 Council Regulation 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the strengthening of the common com-
mercial policy with regard in particular to protection against illicit commercial practices O.J. L252, 20/09/
1984, p. 1.
182 Fediol at para. 19.
183 See the Commission’s arguments in paragraph 18 of the judgment.
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At the time the Court delivered its ruling on Portuguese Textiles, no
Commission interpretation taken under the Trade Barriers Regulation, the
successor of the New Common Commercial Policy Instrument, which was adop-
ted by the Council for the Community to exercise its rights under the WTO
Agreement,184 had been challenged. The clear reference exception was implicitly
conﬁrmed by the CFI in FICF.185
The signiﬁcance of the clear reference exception can hardly be overstated.
Unlike the transposition exception, GATT/WTO law here is not interpreted qua
Community law but on its own merits. What is more important is that, in the
‘clear reference’ cases – overlooking for a moment that the challenge involves a
Community act – it is, in essence, not the conformity of Community legislation
tested against WTO law but the legislation of another WTO Member. The
consequent application of WTO law by the Court in these cases is not such as to
have any further eﬀects in the Community legal order. Conversely, the interpret-
ation given is limited within the facts of ‘ the given case’ and ‘certain speciﬁc
commercial practices ’.186
Consistent interpretation
The previous three instances of the coactive approach concern the application of
WTO law by the Court of Justice itself and not the Member States’ courts. The
doctrine of consistent interpretation, however, applies in all instances when both
the Court of Justice and Member States’ courts are called to interpret otherwise
non-directly eﬀective WTO law.
The Court of Justice, as is characteristic of courts of several Member States,
primarily those belonging to the dualist tradition,187 consistently made eﬀorts to
interpret EC law in conformity with the Community’s international obligations.188
Regarding WTO law, the case laying down the foundations of the doctrine
of consistent interpretation is Herme`s.189 Herme`s was a French company whose
trade mark ‘Herme`s’ was infringed by FHT. The interpretation of Article 50(6)
of the TRIPs Agreement, which provides for provisional measures for the
184 Council Regulation 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down Community procedures in the
ﬁeld of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community’s rights under
international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization O.J. L349, 31/12/1994, p. 71.
185 Case T-317/02 Fe´de´ration des industries condimentaires de France (FICF) and Others v.
Commission of the European Communities [2004] ECR II-4325.
186 Paraphrasing paragraph 20 of the Fediol judgment. Emphasis added.
187 Gerrit Betlem and Andre´ Nollkaemper, ‘Giving Eﬀect to Public International Law and European
Community Law before Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis of the Practice of Consistent
Interpretation’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 569 at pp. 574–575. The principle is
well established in the United States cf. Charming Betsy.
188 Case C-61/94 Commission v. Germany (International Dairy Agreement) [1996] ECR I-3989 at
para 52; Case C-90/92 Dr Tretter v. Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-Ost [1993] ECR I-3569 at para. 11; Case
C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019 at para. 9.
189 Case C-53/96 Herme`s International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603.
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protection of intellectual property rights, was raised in proceedings before
Dutch courts, and the Dutch court referred the matter to the Court of Justice.
In view of the fact that the Court had found in Opinion 1/94 that the
competence under TRIPs Agreement was shared between the Community and
the Member States, without any allocation between them,190 the extent of the
Court’s jurisdiction was also raised. The Court held that, because Regulation
40/94 on the Community trademark provided for provisional measures and
those measures should be taken in the light of the wording and purpose of
Article 50(6) TRIPs,191 the Court had jurisdiction to interpret it, even if the
facts of the case did not concern a Community trademark but one registered
in the Benelux.192 This is because it is clearly in the Community interest that,
in order to forestall future diﬀerences of interpretation, Article 50(6) TRIPs
should be interpreted uniformly whatever the circumstances in which it is to
apply.193
The Court’s assumption that national courts were to interpret Article 50(6)
TRIPs, read together with Advocate General Tesauro’s Opinion favouring direct
eﬀect for Article 50(6) TRIPs, raised the question of direct eﬀect. The Court
avoided the question and simply extended to national courts the duty to interpret
national provisions in the light of international agreements concluded by the
Community.194 The essence of the doctrine of consistent interpretation was later
made clear in Dior where the Court’s reasoning can be summarized, in a general
manner, into the following proposition: in areas falling within the subject-matter
of the WTO Agreement and the Community has already legislated, courts of the
Member States must by virtue of Community law interpret the provisions of
national law as far as possible in the light of the otherwise non-directly eﬀective
provisions of the WTO Agreement.195
Overall, the duty of consistent interpretation provides a satisfactory alternative
to the full direct eﬀect of WTO law. While acknowledging that, owing to their
special nature, WTO rules are not capable of being enforced in the Community
legal order, their undoubted importance at the construction of Community legis-
lation in areas of substantive legislative overlap is thereby restored.196 The practical
implication of these judgments is that WTO law will be interpreted and applied
by Community and national Courts on a daily basis save for when it is in conﬂict
with Community law.
190Herme`s at para. 24.
191Herme`s at para. 28.
192Herme`s at para. 30.
193Herme`s at para. 32. See also, Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Dior and Assco [2000] ECR
I-11344 at paras. 35–37.
194Herme`s at para. 35.
195Dior at para. 49.
196 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart Publishing, 2006), at p. 288.
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The political institutions
The examination of the intention of the parties is of cardinal importance for the
determination of direct eﬀect of any international agreement.197 Whilst the Court
referred to the preambular clause of the Council Decision concluding the WTO
Agreement in order to deny, in principle, direct eﬀect to the WTOAgreements, it is
argued here that the case law analysed above under the coactive approach was
intended to give eﬀect to the intention of the Community institutions as demon-
strated in the NCPI and TBR,198 and the Anti-Dumping199 and Anti-Subsidies
Regulations.200 The political institutions demonstrated strong evidence of their
intentions in the legislative acts under examination, and the Court responded to
the signal that led to the Nakajima and Fediol judgments. The consistency of this
strategy is demonstrated by the subsequent legislative activities of the Community,
especially in the ﬁeld of dumping and subsidies. In the example of the Enabling
Regulation, the interaction between the Court and the political institutions of the
Community in the application of WTO law becomes manifest.
The Enabling Regulation
As mentioned above, shortly after the adoption by the DSB of the Appellate Body
Report in EC–Bed Linen, the Council adopted Regulation 1515/2001 (the
Enabling Regulation) laying down the measures to be taken by the EC so as to
comply with adverse Panel and Appellate Body Reports.201 In accordance with the
Enabling Regulation, the Community should either amend or repeal the disputed
measures or adopt any special measures deemed to be appropriate in the circum-
stances in order to follow the Panel and Appellate Body rulings.202 The
Commission may request all parties to submit all necessary information and it may
conduct a review insofar as this is appropriate.203 The Council may also suspend
the application of the measure but only for a limited period of time.204 The Council
and the Commission may also review measures, not the subject of the dispute, if
197 Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwa¨bisch Gmu¨nd [1987] ECR 3719 and especially the
Opinion of Advocate General Darmon.
198 Case 70/87 Fediol v. Commission [1989] ECR 1825.
199 Council Regulation 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from
countries not members of the European Community [1996] OJ L56, 06/03/1996, p. 1.
200 The Fediol doctrine should apply to Anti-subsidies and Countervailing duties mutatis mutandis.
See, Council Regulation 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection against subsidized imports from
countries not members of the European Community [1997] OJ L288, 21/10/1007, p. 1.
201 Council Regulation (EC) No 1515/2001 on the measures that maybe taken by the Community
following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dumping and anti-
subsidies matters O.J. L 201, 26/07/2001, p. 10. See, Geert A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The Bed Linen Case and its
Aftermath: Some Comment of the European Community’s ‘‘World Trade Organization Enabling
Regulation’’’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 993; Dan Horowitz, ‘A Regulated Scope for EU
Compliance with WTO Rulings’ (2001) 7 International Trade Law and Regulation. 153; McNelis, supra
note 171.
202 Article 1(1) Enabling Regulation.
203 Article 1(3) Enabling Regulation.
204 Article 1(4) Enabling Regulation.
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aﬀected by the legal interpretations made in the Report adopted by the DSB,205
although clearly, in WTO law, they are not obliged to.206 It should be recalled that
in EC–Bed Linen207 the Appellate Body found that the practice of ‘zeroing’ applied
by the EC at the determination of the dumping margin was incompatible with
Article 2.4.2 ADA.208 In the ﬁrst instance of application of the Enabling
Regulation, the Commission issued a Notice inviting all importers against whom
the ‘zeroing’ methodology had been applied at the determination of the anti-
dumping duties, to request a review on the basis of Article 2 of the Enabling
Regulation and in the light of the WTO Panel and Appellate Body inter-
pretations.209
From a Community law perspective, it must be argued that the Community
is not acting as a ‘good citizen’ but in support of its own interests.210 After all,
the Community could still adopt all necessary measures on the basis of Article
133 EC Treaty. However, as McNelis211 pointed out, the Council adopted the
Enabling Regulation because it provides further options in addition to the
interim review provided in the Basic Anti-dumping Regulation.212 More-
over, the procedure enshrined in the Enabling Regulation not only seeks to
enhance the transparency, predictability and automaticity of the response to
a ruling but, as mentioned above, to deter the Court from drawing inspi-
ration from the interpretations contained in the Panel and Appellate Body
rulings in line with the Nakajima doctrine, annulling Anti-Dumping Regu-
lations and ordering the reimbursement of the collected duties to the aﬀected
traders. This mechanism of self-defence has the welcome, from a WTO per-
spective, repercussions of extending the legal interpretations given by the
Panels and Appellate Body to sets of facts unrelated to the WTO dispute
and beyond the res judicata created by the Reports. At the same time, it pre-empts
the Community Courts from applying these interpretations and reserves this
right to the Council and the Commission. Once in control, the political institutions
can utilize the WTO Dispute Settlement System in order to coerce the Com-
munity’s trading partners to comply with the same legal interpretations and
establish a level-playing ﬁeld. For instance, on the issue of ‘zeroing’ methodology,
as soon as the dispute with India ended, the EC initiated a dispute against the
205 Article 2 Enabling Regulation.
206 McNelis, supra note 171 at pp. 659–661.
207 WT/DS141 European Communities – Anti-dumping measures on imports of cotton-type bed-
linen from India.
208 Paragraph 6.119 of the Panel Report upheld by the Appellate Body in Paragraph 86(1) of its
Report.
209 Notice regarding the anti-dumping measures in force following a ruling of the Dispute Settlement
Body of the World Trade Organisation adopted on March 2001 O.J. C 111, 08/05/2002, p. 4.
210 McNelis, supra note 171 at p. 666.
211 Ibid., at p. 649.
212 Article 11(3) Council Regulation 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped
imports from countries not members of the European Community, O.J. L56, 06/03/1996, p. 1.
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United States challenging their use of the ‘zeroing’ methodology at the im-
plementation of their anti-dumping legislation.213
Compliance with Panel and Appellate Body rulings
The ﬁrst few years of operation of the WTO and its Dispute Settlement
System were marked by the two major Hormones and Bananas disputes and
the perceived resistance of the Community institutions to comply with the Panel
and Appellate Body rulings. It could be argued that these instances were seen as
running counter to the Community’s stated policy of compliance with the WTO
Agreement. Some years on, it seems that the Community is developing an
excellent record of compliance with rulings while settling most disputes at the
diplomatic stage of dispute settlement.214 In the Bananas dispute, the Community
adopted legislation to bring its regime into conformity with the rulings,215 it
requested a waiver to maintain its current regime for a transitional period,216 and,
despite some diﬃculties,217 the Community seems to be bringing the matter to a
satisfactory conclusion.218 Similarly, in Hormones, the Community not only did it
take measures which, in its opinion, complied with the DSB recommendations,219
but also challenged the continuing retaliation by Canada and United States.220
In sum, one could describe the coactive approach as the Community playing by
the rules.
213 WT/DS294 United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping
Margins (‘Zeroing ’) complaint brought by the EC on 19 June 2003.
214 Elisa Baroncini, ‘The European Community and the Diplomatic Phase of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding’ (1998) 18 Yearbook of European Law 157. Recent examples include Council
Regulation 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of
origin for agricultural products and foodstuﬀs, O.J. L93, 31/03/2006, p. 12 adopted so as to comply with
the DSB recommendations in WT/DS174 European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuﬀs and Council Regulation 980/2005 of
27 June 2005 applying a scheme of generalised tariﬀ preferences amending the Community’s GSP con-
ditions so as to comply with the DSB recommendations in WT/DS246 European
Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariﬀ Preferences to Developing Countries.
215 Council Regulation 216/2001 of 29 January 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the
common organisation of the market in bananas, O.J. L31, 02/02/2001, p. 2; Council Regulation 2587/
2001 of 19 December 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common organisation of the
market in bananas, O.J. L345, 29/12/2001, p. 13.
216 WT/MIN(01)/16, European Communities – Transitional Regime for the EC autonomous tariﬀ
rate quotas on imports of bananas, Decision of 14 November 2001, Ministerial Conference, Fourth
Session, Doha, 9–14 November 2001.
217 WT/L/616 European Communities – The ACP – EC Partnership Agreement – Recourse to
Arbitration pursuant to the Decision of 14 November 2001, Award of the Arbitrator, 1 August 2005.
218 See, in particular, prembular clause (5) of Council Regulation 1964/2005 of 29 November 2005
on the tariﬀ rates for bananas O.J. L316, 2/12/2005, p. 1.
219 Directive 2003/74 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 amending
Council Directive 96/22/EC concerning the prohibition on the use in stockfarming of certain substances
having a hormonal or thyrostatic action and of beta-agonists, O.J. L262, 14/10/2003, p. 17.
220 WT/DS320 US – Continued suspension of obligations in the EC – Hormones dispute ; WT/DS321
Canada – Continued suspension of obligations in the EC – Hormones dispute.
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4. Proactive approach
The term proactive deﬁnes the position of the Community institutions which is not
limited to the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Community and the
Member States under the WTO Agreements but is perceived to promote WTO law
as the standard for the conduct of international trade externally and the bench-
mark for the adoption of internal legislation. In the context of global governance,
proactivity has been demonstrated in the full support provided by the Community
institutions to the WTO and the conﬁdence entrusted to its dispute settlement
system. Among the institutions, the Court’s approach towards WTO law cannot
be immediately characterized as proactive, a position which is in contrast with the
one taken by Advocates General in their Opinions. It is uncontested that the main
locus of proactivity towards the WTO has been the practice of the Community’s
political institutions.
In the proactive approach, the Community actively encourages the application
of WTO law. WTO law is set as the normative benchmark for the Community’s
internal and external policies and international agreements. Regarding internal
policies, the political institutions adopt legislation that purports to be in con-
formity with WTO law and is normally presumed to achieve this objective.221
Consequently, it is not uncommon for Community legislation to state that its
provisions comply with the relevant provisions of the WTO covered agreements.222
At the formulation of Community policies, the Commission intends to make
them WTO compliant and, in fact, goes to great lengths to develop a full
WTO-compliance test at its interaction with the other institutions.223 The realiz-
ation that WTO law is omnipresent in the everyday activities of the Commission
DGs, as well as the services of the Council and the European Parliament, clearly
indicates that there is an emerging WTO culture, which started to dominate the
law-making process within the Community.
The role of WTO law in the Community’s external relations raises several im-
portant considerations. The WTO and its legal system have developed into an
essential instrument of the Community’s trade diplomacy. Politically, the
Community assists and actively encourages the broadening of the WTO member-
ship by sponsoring the accession process of its important trading partners.224
The Community fully engages in the long and cumbersome accession process
developing countries and formerly centrally planned economies are faced with, it
introduces WTO law by reference in its relations with non-WTO members, and
221 Snyder, supra note 1 at p. 316.
222 See, Sebastiaan Princen, ‘EC Compliance with WTO Law: the Interplay of Law and Politics’
(2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 555; Sebastiaan Princen, EU Regulation and
Transatlantic Trade (Kluwer Law International, 2002).
223 de Bu´rca and Scott, supra note 1.
224 The EU acted as a catalyst to the Chinese accession and is doing the same with the accession of the
Russian Federation to the WTO.
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treats the WTO Agreements as the common vocabulary for the conduct of inter-
national trade. For example, international agreements concluded before the entry
into force of theWTOAgreement made reference to the forthcoming conclusion of
the Uruguay Round, rendering the agreements’ provisions subject to amendment
in the light of the results of multilateral negotiations.225 In some cases, agreements
concluded by the Community will stipulate the revision of their provisions when
accession to the WTO is achieved by the other contracting party.226
All in all, it is hard to ﬁnd any post-1995 Association Agreements, Partnership
and Cooperation Agreements, Trade and Development Agreements, Stabilization
and Association Agreements concluded by the Community without a detailed
reference to WTO law.227 The relations thus established are instrumental towards
the furthering of the objectives of the multilateral system as it becomes clear for
WTO and non-WTOMembers alike what standard they are expected to follow in
their trade relations with the Community and its Member States. In so far as
bilateral agreements of a general nature are concerned, turningWTO rules into the
applicable standard will inevitably strengthen the culture of WTO compliance in
the Community’s legislative practice.
In addition, WTO law has been at the forefront of sectoral agreements con-
cluded with developed trading partners, in particular the US. For instance, the
preamble of Council Decision 98/258/EC on the conclusion of the Agreement be-
tween the European Community and the United States of America on sanitary
measures to protect public and animal health in trade in live animals and animal
products states, ‘Whereas the Agreement between the European Community and
the United States of America on sanitary measures to protect public and animal
225 Article 59 of the Europe Agreement establishing an Association between the European
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the other part O.J.
L358, states: ‘The provisions of Chapters II, III, and IV of Title IV shall be adjusted by decision of the
Association Council in the light of the result of the negotiations on services taking place in the Uruguay
Round and in particular to ensure that under any provisions of this Agreement a Party grants to the other
Party a treatment no less favourable than that accorded under the provisions of a future GATS
Agreement. ’
226 See, for instance, Articles 4, 5, 16 and Annex 2 of the Agreement on partnership and cooperation
establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and
the Russian Federation, of the other part, O.J. L327, 28/11/1997, pp. 3–69.
227 Notably, Articles 20, 24, 61, 70, 78, 80, 83, 89, 92, and 103 of the Agreement establishing an
association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of
Chile, of the other part, O.J. L352, 30/12/2002, pp. 3–1439. The EC – Chile Agreement is particularly
interesting in that it not only it refers to the WTO generally or the WTO Annexed Agreements speciﬁcally,
but also to Decisions taken by bodies established under the WTO Agreement, in particular, the TBT
Committee (Article 85). More importantly, it subordinates the dispute settlement system established under
the Agreement to the WTO DSU should any of the contracting parties chooses to seek redress for a
violation of obligations under the EC – Chile in theWTO (Article 189(4)(c)). Also, Articles 6, 15, 29, 65 of
the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member
States, of the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, O.J. L84, 20/
03/2004, pp. 13–81 and in particular Article 69(5) which for the purposes of states aids sets the relevant
WTO rules and Community legislation as alternative normative frameworks.
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health in trade in live animals and animal products provides an adequate means
for putting into practice the provisions of the WTO Agreement on the application
of sanitary and phytosanitary measures as regards public and animal health
measures. ’228 In fact, the agreement establishes a Joint Committee, which is en-
trusted with the task to guide the activities carried out under the Agreement.229 At a
ﬁrst glance, such agreement must be interpreted as a bilateral instrument, which
seeks to apply and consequentially promote the WTO rules. However, scratching
below the surface, one must note that, although the development of mutually
acceptable SPS standards must be seen as furthering the objectives and principles
of the WTO Agreement, the SPS Agreement in this instance, it may also have
the side eﬀect of restricting market access to non-participants to such a bilateral
arrangement.230 This remark notwithstanding, the Community’s policy to con-
clude bilateral mutual recognition agreements with reference to WTO law clearly
forms part of its proactive approach.
From the point of view of judicial enforcement, it could be argued that pro-
visions of agreements concluded by the Community containing clear reference to
the WTO Agreement could develop direct eﬀect ; predominantly so, regarding
agreements with states non-members of the WTO, and, therefore, incapable of
availing themselves of the WTO DSU. This is reinforced by the requirement in-
serted in such agreements to be implemented ‘ in full conformity with the pro-
visions of the WTO’.231 Importantly, according to the Court’s case law, the nature
and purpose of these agreements do not preclude individuals from invoking their
provisions in national courts.232 When such provisions refer to WTO rules, the
answer to the question of their judicial enforceability depends on whether the
speciﬁc provisions of the WTO Agreement to which the Community’s bilateral
agreements refer will be treated as forming part of the latter agreements. If this is
the case, they should be analysed in the light of the nature and purpose of the
Community’s agreements and not the WTO Agreement. Were this to be accepted
and should they contain a clear, precise, and unconditional obligation, they will be
enforced in national courts in accordance with the established case law.233 In the
alternative, it can be argued that in such cases both the Community and the as-
sociated states intended to transpose speciﬁc WTO rules in their legal orders.
228 O.J. L118, 21/4/1998, p. 1.
229 Article 14(1) of the Agreement.
230 M. J. Trebilcock and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 3rd edition (Routledge,
2005), at p. 230.
231 Inter alia, Article 34 of the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean
and Paciﬁc Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the
other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, O.J. L317, 15/12/2000, p. 3.
232 Case C-265/03 Simutenkov [2005] ECR I-2579 extended this principle to Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements. See also, Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund [2003] ECR I-4135; Case
C-18/90 Kziber [1991] ECR I-199; Case C-262/96 Su¨ru¨l [1999] ECR I-2685; Case C-162/00
Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer [2002] ECR I-1049.
233 Ibid.
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Extending the Nakajima doctrine to cover these cases too should not be ruled
out.234
With reference to the eﬀect of Panel and Appellate Body rulings, Article 85 of
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Azerbaijan may be
relevant in that it states :
When examining any issue arising within the framework of the Agreement in
relation to a provision referring to an article of the GATT/WTO, the
Cooperation Council shall take into account to the greatest extent possible the
interpretation that is generally given to the article of the GATT/WTO in question
by the Members of the WTO.235
This provision aﬀords the interpretation that institutional bodies set up by inter-
national agreements concluded by the Community must apply the interpretations
rendered by the Panel and Appellate Body adopted by the DSB. This goes further
than the nature of DSB recommendations under the WTO Agreement itself and
possibly further than the Enabling Regulation, analysed above. In addition, should
the conditions identiﬁed in the previous paragraph apply, and WTO rules become
directly eﬀective by virtue of reference to them in the Community’s international
agreements, then Panel and Appellate Body interpretations of these provisions
must be taken into account. If the opposite is the case, it will be diﬃcult to argue in
favour of direct eﬀect of Panel and Appellate Body rulings for the reasons ident-
iﬁed by the Court in the analysis of the reactive approach, in particular after the
Court’s judgment in Van Parys. By contrast, it could be argued that the proviso in
the PCA with Azerbaijan may simply extend the general interpretative duty and
practice of the Community institutions to employ the interpretations rendered by
the WTO bodies236 to organs established under international agreements con-
cluded by the Community.
The above analysis is illustrative of the emergence of WTO law as a standard at
the carrying out of the Community’s internal and external policies. The import-
ance of WTO law as the standard for the conduct of international trade regardless,
it is diﬃcult to surmise the purpose behind the institutional WTOphilia, particu-
larly evident within the Commission. Clearly, it is the conﬂict-avoidance – and
consequently, WTO dispute avoidance – strategy of the Commission than the
suitability of the WTO norms. Observing the Community’s international com-
mitments is important; however, they can only serve as a framework wherein the
234 As explained by the CFI in Chiquita at para. 124 ‘The applicant rightly argues that application of
the Nakajima case law is not, a priori, limited to the area of anti-dumping. It is capable of being applied in
other areas governed by the provisions of the WTO Agreements where those agreements and the
Community provisions whose legality is in question are comparable in nature and content to those just
referred to above concerning the Anti-Dumping Codes of the GATT and the anti-dumping basic regu-
lations which transpose them into Community law.’
235 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part, O.J. L246, 17/9/1999, p. 3.
236 Rosas, supra note 100.
The European Union and WTO law 81
Community formulates its policies in order to achieve its own constitutional ob-
jectives. These are, in some instances, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those of the
WTO. Unless an express reference to the need for compliance with WTO is in-
serted in the preamble to the EC Treaty, the Community should primarily concern
itself with the formulation of policies in the interests of the Community and its
Member States which may not necessarily coincide with, and are normally more
complex than, the rudimentary framework established by the WTO. While the
proactive approach is, in general, welcome, limits to the proactive practice of
the Community’s political institutions must be set.
5. Synthesis and critique
The starting point for the assessment of the application of WTO law in the
Community legal order should be the balancing act the Community institutions,
including the Court, need to perform between two competing considerations: the
supremacy of international law and the supremacy of Community law.237 While
the supremacy of international law has always been appealing to commentators
regarding the Community as a sui generis legal order founded by international
law,238 the Court has been vigilant at the support of the supremacy of Community
law.239 In fact, the Court, in Opinion 1/91, was quick to acknowledge the su-
premacy of the Community Treaties over provisions of the proposed EEA
Agreement. It held that the jurisdiction of the proposed EEA Court aﬀected the
allocation of responsibilities as deﬁned by the EC Treaty and therefore, under-
mined the autonomy of the Community legal order.240 Inevitably, the recognition
of direct eﬀect of WTO law would deprive the Court of Justice from the authority
to uphold the supremacy of the Community.
The scales in the balancing act could be represented by the concepts of monism
and dualism; monism being inherently prone to accord supremacy to international
law and dualism to domestic/Community law. The catalysts for the balancing act
in this sense are ‘compatibility ’ and ‘direct eﬀect ’. The starting point for the
analysis of the relationship between international law and Community law should
be Article 300(5) which provides that when an agreement ‘calls for ’241 amend-
ments to the Treaty, those must be adopted ﬁrst before the agreement is concluded.
Further, Article 300(6), which concerns the advisory jurisdiction of the Court,
provides that where the Court of Justice ﬁnds that an envisaged international
agreement is incompatible with the Treaty, the agreement may enter into force
only if the Treaty is amended. These paragraphs represent a deﬁnitive statement
237 Klabbers, supra note 4 at p. 271.
238 Pescatore, supra note 31.
239 Christian Timmermans, ‘The EU and Public International Law’ (1999) 4 European Foreign
Aﬀairs Review 181.
240 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079.
241 Emphasis added.
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that the Treaties, as the ‘Constitution’ of the Community, are supreme and cannot
be subordinated to provisions of international agreements unless the authors of the
Treaty so decide.242 Article 300(7) states ‘Agreements concluded under the con-
ditions set out in this Article – namely, the conditions enshrined in the previous
six paragraphs of Article 300, including paragraphs 5 and 6 – shall be binding on
the institutions of the Community and on the Member States’ ; does this presume
that those agreements shall be binding insofar as they are compatible with the
Treaty? This constitutes a reasonable assumption.
The obligation of compatibility of international agreements has recently been
extended also to the internal rules. Indeed, the Council and the Commission are
now charged with the task to ensure this at the negotiation of international
agreements.243 While, from a WTO legal perspective,244 this amendment is not a
novelty as it integrates a pre-existing obligation into the Community Treaties, the
Council and the Commission will be faced with a considerable task at the con-
clusion of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations if they are properly to
discharge this responsibility. Nonetheless, while the ‘compatibility’ catalyst is
relatively unexplored, its emergence heralds a notable shift of the Treaty authors to
a dualist approach towards WTO law. This will be seen in the future, account
being taken of the proliferation of studies comparing the substantive law of the
WTO and the EU245 and the building of a body of jurisprudence by the Panels and
Appellate Body of the WTO.
Moving on to the ‘direct eﬀect ’ catalyst,246 the Court has been unequivocal. Its
outright denial of direct eﬀect of WTO law points towards a dualist understanding
and the supremacy of Community legal order over the international one. The
notable exceptions analysed in the context of the coactive approach prove the rule.
Beyond the reasons analysed previously, some further considerations and con-
ditions for change of course will follow. The WTO – unlike the Community,
which created a new legal order whose subjects are not only theMember States but
also their nationals247 – does not enjoy such high aspirations.248 On the contrary, it
was designed in the traditional public international law sense in which states and
242 Bourgeois, supra note 153 at p. 97.
243 Article 133(3) EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Nice.
244 Article XIV:4 WTO Agreement.
245 Marise Cremona, ‘Neutrality or Discrimination? The WTO, the EU and External Trade’ in G. de
Bu´rca and J. Scott (eds.), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Hart Publishing, 2003)
p. 151; F. Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of EC
and WTO Law (Hart Publishing, 2004); Joanne Scott, ‘ International Trade and Environmental
Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO’ (2004) 15 European Journal of
International Law 307; M. Slotboom, A Comparison of WTO and EC Law, Do Diﬀerent Objects and
Purposes Matter for Treaty Interpretation? (Cameron May, 2006).
246 Klabbers, supra note 4 at pp. 292–298.
247 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1; Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079 at para. 21.
248 ‘Following this approach, the GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order the subjects of which
comprise both contracting parties or Members and their nationals. ’ Panel Report in WT/DS152/R United
States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974 at para. 7.72.
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international organizations are the main subjects. Despite its broad scope, it is
clear that its Members never wished it to become a new world legal order, com-
prising also their citizens. Its structure and mechanisms are such so as to exclude
the citizens from being part of the system.249 Further, the WTO is characterized by
the absence of a norm-generating mechanism.250 The rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations strike a delicate balance of rights and concessions, which, owing to
the intergovernmental nature of the agreement, confer public law rights belonging
to the WTO Members rather than the individual traders.
The jewel of this international law structure is the rigorous dispute settlement
system established by the DSU. The clear and unambiguous nature of its provisions
can be advocated as a reason for opening up the Community to the direct eﬀect of
WTO law. In this respect, one wonders what purpose such a rigorous dispute
settlement serves if the WTO Agreement intended to confer rights on individuals
enforceable in WTO Members’ courts.251 It has been argued that since the old
GATT ﬂexibility is gone, there is no need to insist upon the lack of direct eﬀect, as
now there is a binding international adjudication. This argument is not convincing
at all. On the contrary, the bindingness and rigour of the DSU militate against
direct eﬀect. Private parties have national avenues to invite their governments
to pursue their interests in Geneva and the guarantee that once there, a report
creating a binding obligation in international law will, sooner or later, serve their
interests. This is further strengthened by the fact that, at least in the context of
the TBR, the Court of Justice has granted private parties a signiﬁcant avenue of
control of the institutions at the exercise of their functions, thus oﬀering a
counterbalance for the denial of direct eﬀect.252
Were the opposite the case, the choice of market access barriers to be challenged
would be determined by the interests of private parties and not the WTO
Members. This transfer of control clearly falls beyond what the parties have agreed
when concluding the Uruguay Round Agreements and establishing the multilateral
trading system under the administration of the WTO. From the point of view of
encouraging compliance with the WTO, it should be pointed out that enforcement
in national and Community courts can only have the eﬀect of repealing the WTO-
inconsistent legislation. This hardly resembles the compliance envisaged within the
DSU itself. From a policy point of view, it is in principle undesirable to have the
WTO bodies and Community Courts handling the same cases. They are destined
249 With the exception of NGOs in an attempt to embrace civil society (Article V:2 WTO Agreement)
and certain procedural rights. See, Steve Charnovitz, ‘The WTO and the Rights of the Individual’ (2001)
36 Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy 98.
250 de Bu´rca and Scott, supra note 1 at pp. 2–7.
251 See also AG Lenz’s Opinion in Case C-469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato
v. Chiquita [1995] ECR I-4533 at para. 21.
252 Case 70/87 Fediol v. Commission [1989] ECR 1825; Case T-317/02 Fe´de´ration des industries
condimentaires de France (FICF) and Others v. Commission of the European Communities [2004] ECR
II-4325.
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to create conﬂicts, something that hardly facilitates the objective of the DSU to
provide ‘security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’.253 In the
absence of a preliminary reference system, mirroring the one established under
the Community constitutional order,254 direct eﬀect of WTO law can hardly serve
the multilateral trading system.255
A realistic argument however needs to be made. It is unfair for individual traders
to pay the bill either by being subject to market access barriers or suﬀering the
consequences from the suspension of concessions aﬀecting their trade. Does this in
any way mitigate the stance against direct eﬀect of the WTO and, in particular,
Community liability for breach of WTO law? The answer should be in the nega-
tive. What this realization does is to expose the shortcomings of the WTO system
and encourage proposals for its reform instead of challenging the proper under-
standing of this system by the Court of Justice. Rosas has suggested that the system
of suspension of concessions should be abolished in favour of a system of com-
pensation, whereby the Arbitrators under Article 22.6 DSU will calculate the
amount of nulliﬁcation or impairment of beneﬁts suﬀered by a WTOMember and
determine the sum of compensation due.256 This is a proposal which should muster
support in the reform of the DSU process.
Regarding the proactive approach, the WTOization of the Community legis-
lative engine represents a controversial realization and raises issues of both sub-
stance and process. Regarding substance, opening up to a legal system with lower
standards of environmental protection, public health and labour laws, and a
comprehensive global membership represents a cause for concern.257 Moreover, it
has been argued that the normative subordination of the Community to the WTO
is destined to put the European social model at risk.258 The concerns raised are
exacerbated by the dramatic change in the European Union’s economic and pol-
itical architecture resulting from its enlargement.259
More importantly, regarding process, are we convinced that the WTO is better
suited for the European Union than its own law-making processes, a result of no
little eﬀort, compromise and continuous debate?260 Issues of democracy, legit-
imacy, and accountability are raised in this context too.261 The European Union
despite its more developed characteristics in this respect, still has a long way to
253 Article 3.2 DSU.
254 Rosas, supra note 1.
255 See also Eeckhout, supra note 57 at p. 99.
256 Rosas, supra note 72 at p. 144.
257 But see, Marco M. Slotbloom, ‘Do Public Health Measures Receive Similar Treatment in
European Community and World Trade Organization Law?’ (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 553.
258 Antoniadis, supra note 143 at p. 343.
259 D. C. Vaughan-Whitehead, EU Enlargement versus Social Europe? The Uncertain Future of the
European Social Model (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2003).
260 Eeckhout, supra note 57 at p. 100.
261 Ibid.
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tread.262 However, citizens aﬀected in their everyday lives still ﬁnd it diﬃcult to
accept the normative dominance of Community law encapsulated in the principle
of direct eﬀect and its concomitant, the principle of supremacy.263 This is more so
within the WTO context. What is increasingly worrying is the impression given by
the Commission that it treats WTO law as the ‘supreme law’. The substantive
falseness of this approach regardless, the absence of any public debate at the for-
mulation of WTO rules – instead, the single undertaking procedure is followed in
the multilateral rounds of trade negotiations – , the limited role reserved to the
European Parliament at the negotiation and conclusion of the agreement on behalf
of the European Union, and the fact that dispute settlement takes place behind
closed doors,264 indicate that there is less likelihood for WTO law to be received
with enthusiasm. The position of the Commission is inherently paradoxical, as the
Commission itself has identiﬁed the need for increase in legitimacy and account-
ability within the European Union context.265
Conclusions
As Trachtman put it ‘the question of direct eﬀect is a political decision’.266 The
Community Treaties, along with the Council Decision concluding the WTO
Agreement, represent the authentic political statement by theMember States on the
issue of WTO law. The Court has appropriately responded and dismissed the calls
from commentators to undervalue the normative merit of the relevant clause in
the Council Decision concluding the WTO Agreement.267 If the combined inter-
pretation of the case law, the legislative activity and the institutional practice
means that the Community legal order is a dualist one for the purposes of
the application of WTO law, then so be it.268 Following from this, unless
the Community transforms WTO law into the Community legal system by means
of transposition into its own legislative instruments, WTO law cannot have
direct eﬀect. Hermeneutically, this means that the Community chose WTO law as
a second best set of rules. In its internal policy-making, it uses WTO law as a
benchmark and accepts its primacy in its commercial policy instruments.
Ordinarily, it tries to interpret legislation consistently with the WTO Agreements.
262 A. Arnull and D. Wincott (eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford
University Press, 2003).
263 The disaﬀection towards the European Union looming in manyMember States and made manifest
in the recent French and Dutch referenda is illustrative of this proposition.
264 Which is not reversed by the groundbreaking decision to hold the proceedings in public in WT/
DS320 US – Continued suspension of obligations in the EC – Hormones dispute ; WT/DS321
Canada – Continued suspension of obligations in the EC – Hormones dispute.
265 White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001)428, 25 July 2001.
266 Joel Trachtman, ‘Bananas, direct eﬀect and compliance’ (1999) 10 European Journal of
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267 Consequently, it is not the Court playing a political role as Klabbers suggested, supra note 4 at
p. 298.
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Apart from those exceptions, which do not, in essence, involve the application of
WTO law but its communitarized version, WTO law may not be invoked in the
Community and national courts, predominantly so if it is to challenge Community
legislation. In the external relations of the Community, WTO law may serve as a
particularly useful benchmark. The use of WTO norms in the material provisions
of the Community’s international agreements will facilitate trade liberalization
and will have a positive impact on the establishment of a level-playing inter-
national trading ﬁeld.
In sum, the analysis of the case law and institutional practice leads to the con-
clusion that the Community possesses a ﬁnely tuned system for the application of
WTO law, which is the result of the interaction between the Court and the political
institutions. It is not as receptive to WTO law as some commentators would pre-
fer, but neither as inconsistent as often accused. Until signiﬁcant changes within
the WTO and its law-making mechanism materialize to enable WTO law to play a
more important role, this elaborate nexus of approaches should be considered as
thoroughly satisfactory.
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